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INTRODUCTION

In 1991, after the Supreme Court granted certiorari' to review the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Image Technical Servic2s,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,2 antitrust practitioners and scholars became
hopeful that the Court would seize the opportunity to clarify antitrust
tying jurisprudence and provide much needed guidance to the bench and
bar Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's 6 to 3 decision in Kodak in
June, 1992, resolves very little and instead promises to raise more
substantive and procedural questions than it answers.'
Rather than clearly define the parameters of an illegal tying
arrangement, the Kodak decision is likely to provoke greater uncertainty
in this already confused area of antitrust law. The Court ignored
concerns regarding the propriety of continuing a modified per se analysis
for tie-ins and thus left the already blurry line between rule of reason and
per se approaches even less clear. The majority opinion in Kodak could
also trigger significant and protracted debate as well as considerable
confusion regarding critical market definition and market power
questions. Further, Kodak may require reconsideration of the appropriate
standards for using summary judgment in the antitrust context, as lower
federal courts may struggle to reconcile it wilh other precedents
regarding the propriety of summary judgment in antitrust cases.

1. 111 S. Ct. 2823 (1991).
2. 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
3. See David Pester, Antitrust Law: Removing the Confusion in Tying Arrangement
Jurisprudence, 1990 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 699, 701, 745; Michael L. Weiner & James A. Keyte,
Supreme Court Preview-Image Technical Services: More Than Meets the Eye, Antitrust,
Fall/Winter 1991, at 18. Professor Areeda, a prolific antitrust scholar who has written extensively
regarding tying analysis, has also observed that the pre-Kodak state of the law was less than crystal
clear. See IX Phillip E. Areeda,Antitrust Law 1722b, at 288-90 (1991).
4. See infra notes 124-274 and accompanying text.

Tying Arrangements
This Article begins with a brief history of the Supreme Court's often
unclear and contradictory treatment of tying arrangements. Against this
historical background, the discussion then turns to an analysis of the
majority and dissenting opinions in Kodak in part I. Part IV focuses on
the important legal questions left unresolved by Kodak and considers its
impact on existing tying doctrine. Finally, the Article discusses possible
alternative approaches to existing tying analysis.
The pervading theme of the Article is that the Supreme Court has
missed an opportunity to articulate a clearer, more workable rule
regarding tie-ins.
While the actual result in Kodak may be
unobjectionable, the Article demonstrates that the Court failed to deliver
the result in a useful package. Further, the Article assesses the impact of
Kodak on antitrust doctrine more generally and focuses on issues left
unsettled by the decision.
II.

TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE SUPREME COURT-A
CHECKERED HISTORY

A classic tie-in occurs when a seller or lessor conditions the sale or
lease of product A upon the acceptance of product B by the buyer or
lessee. This type of agreement necessarily has the effect of preventing
the buyer or lessee from dealing with the seller or lessor's rivals in the
market for product B.
The Supreme Court's treatment of tying arrangements has hardly been
a model of clarity or consistency. On the contrary, the Court has never
satisfactorily resolved the status of tie-ins for purposes of antitrust
analysis. After expressing dissatisfaction with the Court's early tying
decisions pursuant to the Sherman Act,5 Congress passed the Clayton Act
to enhance antitrust enforcement against tying arrangements.6
5. The legislative history of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988), suggests that
Congress was concerned that the judicial decisions were not addressing tying arrangements
sufficiently pursuant to section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). See 2 Earl W. Kintner,
The LegislativeHistory of the FederalAntitrust Laws and Related Statutes 995, 1431 (1978); 3 id.
2125,2397,2539,2676,2698,2704,2770.
6. Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides that:
[l]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to
lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or
other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the
United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or
other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or
discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
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Nevertheless, this attempt to strengthen legislative support for antitrust
actions against tie-ins ultimately failed to clarify matters.
The Supreme Court has treated tie-ins both with hostility and
considerable tolerance over the past 100 years.7 At one point, the Court
came very close to per se condemnation of these restraints when it
concluded that tying arrangements serve little purpose other than the
suppression of competition 8-the classic rationale for a per se rule. Not
surprisingly, in the wake of that utterance, a number of decisions
characterized tie-ins as potentially illegal per se.9 If, however, tying

effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in .my line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14.
Although section 3's language is more directly applicable to exclusive dealing or requirements
contracts, the provision is broad enough to cover tying arrangements For a discussion of cases
applying section 3 to tie-ins, see infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text. For discussion of
different views regarding appropriate standards of legality pursuant to section 3, see infra notes
27-29, 51-52, 255-57, 281,283 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 13-121 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court explained in Northern
Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), courts can presume some conduct
conclusively "illegal without elaborate inquiry" because of its "pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue." In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85 (1984), Justice Stevens noted: "Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances
make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination
of the challenged conduct." Id. at 103-04 (footnote and citation omitted). In Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), Justice Powell explained:
Per se rules thus require the Court to make broad generalizations about the social utility of
particular commercial practices. The probability that anticompetitiva consequences will result
from a practice and the severity of those consequences must be balanced against its
procompetitive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per se
rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the
time and expense necessary to identify them. Once established, per se rules tend to provide
guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens oa litigants and the judicial
system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials ....
Id. at 50 n.16.
In contrast, the rule of reason requires that the trier of fact "weigh[] all of the circumstances of a
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition." Id. at 49. In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978), the Court concluded that the critical question in rule of reason analysis is
"whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition." Justice Stevens explained:
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis In the first category are
agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate
study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are "illegal per se." In the
second category are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing

Tying Arrangements
arrangements were truly per se illegal, the inquiry would go no further
once the court has found that a tie-in exists, regardless of any potential
procompetitive effects or the absence of significant competitive injury.
Despite this characterization, courts never conclusively labeled all tie-ins
per se illegal and, adding to the confusion, often substituted a quasi-per
se rule."0 Although the Supreme Court continues to articulate a quasi-per
se rule, it has adopted a much more benign view of tying arrangements in
its more recent opinions and has distinguished earlier doctrine."
The Supreme Court has never clearly treated tie-ins either as the
equivalent of the classic per se violation or as a candidate for uniform
rule of reason treatment for purposes of antitrust analysis. Instead, the
decisions have vacillated, leaving litigants and scholars to ponder and
attempt to apply an unwieldy and confused quasi-per se principle that
continues to confound students of antitrust law. Unfortunately, the
Kodak decision does little to solve the riddle; in fact, it confuses matters
further and generates even greater uncertainty.
A.

The Early Tying Decisions Under the Sherman Act

After the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890,2 questions regarding
the validity of tying arrangements first reached the Supreme Court in
Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.'3 and were again considered in United States v.
Winslow. 4 In both of the foregoing cases, the Court demonstrated an
unwillingness to condemn tie-ins pursuant to the Sherman Act. In Dick,

the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was
imposed. In either event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint.
Id. at 692.
As the tying and other antitrust cases illustrate, the distinction between per se and rule of reason
principles is not always clear. See infra notes 243, 245 and accompanying text.
10. Courts use a quasi-perserule to label tying asperse illegal upon a finding of market power in
the tying product and the foreclosure of a not insubstantial amount of competition in the tied
product. The mere existence of a tie does not suffice to establish illegality, but unlike true rule of
reason analysis, there is no requirement of a balancing of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.
See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 72-122 and accompanying text.
12. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which applies to tying arrangements, provides, in relevant part,
that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15

U.S.C. § 1.
13. 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S.
502(1917).
14. 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
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plaintiff sold patented duplicating machines on the -ondition that buyers
use only plaintiff's ink." The Court found the defendant, who had been
manufacturing and selling ink for use in the machines, guilty of
contributory infringement of the patent, and rejected restraint of trade
arguments as a defense. 6 Similarly, in Winslow, a tying arrangement
involving patented shoe machinery passed muster even though the firm
imposing the restraint held a clear dominance in the tying product. 7
B.

The Post-ClaytonAct Decisions-TheEvolution of a Quasi-PerSe
Rule

1.

Uncertainty in the Seminal Cases

The laissez-faire approach of these early cases prompted Congress to
respond by enacting section 3 of the Clayton Act in 1914.8 The initial
judicial response to the more enforcement oriented language of section 3
was to find tying arrangements offensive to antitrust policy. In later
cases this policy evolved into a quasi-per se approach to tying
arrangements pursuant to both the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
In the first post-Clayton Act decision, Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 9 the Court rejected a patent
infringement claim on facts quite similar to those presented in Dick. In
Motion Picture Patents, plaintiff licensed the use of its patented motion
picture projector on the condition that only plaintiff's films be exhibited
with the projector." Recognizing that plaintiffs projector was essential
to the operation of a movie theatre, and further noting that the restraint
could extend plaintiff's monopoly into the film market, the Court
expressly overruled Dick and found no infringemeni. 2' The Court did not
specifically find the tying arrangement to be an antitrust violation, but it
did refer to section 3 of the Clayton Act and noted the competitive harms
effected by the tie-in.22

15. Dick, 224 U.S. at 11-12,25-26.
16. Id. at 28-30.
17. Winslow, 227 U.S. at 217-18.
18. For the text of section 3 of the Clayton Act, see supra note 6.
19. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
20. Id. at 506-07.
21. Id. at518-19.
22. Id. at 517-19.

Tying Arrangements
Soon after Motion Picture Patents, in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.,' the attempt to enforce the antitrust laws against tieins was temporarily frustrated. In United Shoe, the Court refused to
conclude that the tying of leases of patented shoe machinery to other
machines by a dominant firm was inherently unlawful pursuant to section
1 of the Sherman Act.2 4 The Court relied in part on the interest of a
machine manufacturer with a valid patent, who was leasing rather than
selling, in protecting the quality of the machines.' Further, the Court
recognized the manufacturer's interest in making the machines available
on favorable terms.26
In a subsequent action, however, the United Shoe leases were
successfully attacked.27 Unlike the previous United Shoe case, this time
the government proceeded under section 3 of the Clayton Act.
Distinguishing section 3 from section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme
Court noted that section 3 requires only a probability of a substantial
lessening of competition, while the Sherman Act contemplates proof of
an actual diminution of competition.2 8 In addition, the Court relied on
the language of section 3 which expressly made it applicable to patented
goods, and the Court also recognized that the attempt by a manufacturer
with market power in one product line to extend it into another
necessarily had a negative impact on competition.29
The Court's apparent implication in United Shoe that tying
arrangements could be inherently suspect was somewhat contradicted by
its decision the following year in FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co. 30 In
Sinclair, the Court declined to invalidate an arrangement whereby a
lessor of gasoline pumps bearing its trademark and name required the
lessees to use the pumps only to sell the lessor's gasoline.3 1 Stressing the
absence of economic power in the tying product (the pumps), and
recognizing that lessees could sell other brands of gasoline from other
vendors' or lessors' pumps, the Court found the tie-in unobjectionable.32

23. 247 U.S. 32 (1918).

24. Id. at 60-67.
25. Id. at 64.
26. Id. at 63.
27. United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
28. Id. at 459-60.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at460-61.
261 U.S. 463 (1923).
Id. at 466,469.
Id. at 474-75.
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The Court also focused upon the issue of consumer goodwill and
avoidance of deception to justify the restraint.33 Consumers expected
Sinclair gasoline to be in the Sinclair labeled pumps. The discussion of
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects resulting from the tie-in
belied the notion that the Supreme Court was wedded to the idea of true
per se illegality for all tying arrangements. Rather, the case reflected an
ambivalence regarding tie-ins notwithstanding the incipiency language of
section 3 of the Clayton Act.
2.

The IncreasedEmphasis on Per Se Principles

As one prominent antitrust scholar has noted, the cases following
Sinclair became increasingly hostile to tying arrangements and began to
militate strongly in favor of per se illegality for tie-ins. 34 In a series of
decisions the Supreme Court created the impression that tying
arrangements should be given short shrift by federal courts when assailed
as antitrust violations. That is not to say, however, that the Court treated
tie-ins in precisely the same manner as it chose to treat classic per se
offenses such as horizontal price-fixing.
In International Business Machines Corp. v. United States,3 5 IBM
leased its patented computing machines only to thoSe who agreed to use
IBM punch cards with them. 6 While the Court did note that the tying
product (the computing machine) was patented,3 7 there was no detailed
analysis of market structure. Rather, the Court focused upon the fact that
BM's competitors engaged in the same practices, arnd also indicated that
foreclosure of competition in the tied product (punch cards) was
substantial.38 Further, the Court rejected IBM's alleged justification for
the tie-in, which was predicated on the need to maintain punch card
quality control to prevent machine damage and injury to defendant's
goodwill.3 9 Instead, the Court indicated that IBM could protect its name
by providing specifications for the punch cards and requiring lessees to
comply with those specifications.4" Thus, without any elaborate inquiry
into market structure or any detailed attempt to balance procompetitive
33. Id. at 475.
34. See Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Handbookof the Law ofAntitrust 436 (1977) (noting that the
Court turned sharply towards aperse rule in the 1930s).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

298 U.S. 131 (1936).
Id. at 134.
Id. at 134, 137.
Id. at 135-37.
Id. at 138-40.
Id. at 139-40.

Tying Arrangements
and anticompetitive effects, the Court found the tying arrangement
unlawful. Despite the Court's failure to utilize any specific per se
language in IBM, the trend was undeniably towards harsher treatment for
tie-ins.
Several years later, in InternationalSalt Co. v. United States,4 the
Court actually referred to a per se rule while invalidating a tying
arrangement. In International Salt, defendant leased patented salt
dispensing machines on the condition that lessees buy their salt from
defendant.42 Defendant contended that the reasonableness of the restraint
was a triable issue of fact precluding the entry of summary judgment for
the government.4 3 Rejecting defendant's contention, the Court affirmed
the entry of summary judgment and analogized to per se price-fixing
cases.' The opinion failed to offer any real discussion of market power;
the Court only noted the patented nature of the tying product. 45 Instead,
the Court emphasized the quantity of salt used by lessees of defendant's
machines and the fact that salt-selling competitors were foreclosed from
competing for that business. 46 The Court also rejected quality control
justifications for the tying arrangement. Responding to the contention
that impure salt could damage the machines, the Court noted, as in IBM,
that specifications could deal with that concern in a less restrictive
manner.4 7 Thus, InternationalSalt created the impression that neither
significant market power nor other evidence of anticompetitive effects
would be required to invalidate tie-ins either under section 1 or section 3.
This apparent absence of any requirement of proof of unreasonableness
is, of course, the essence of aperse approach.
Subsequent to InternationalSalt, the Court was less than clear as to
whether it was endorsing aperse approach to tie-ins or actually adopting
some other methodology. In Times-Picayune PublishingCo. v. United
41. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
42. Id. at 393. Actually, the lease agreements did allow lessees of one patented machine to use
another source of salt if a competitor offered salt of equal quality at a better price. Id. at 394 n.5.
Further, lessees of another patented machine were entitled to the benefit of any general price
reduction on defendant's salt. Id. at 395 n.6. Defendant contended that this demonstrated the
reasonableness of its tying arrangement, but the Court rejected that argument. Id. at 396-97. For an
interesting discussion of InternationalSalt and possible reasons for defendant's imposition of the tie,
see John L. Peterman, The InternationalSalt Case, 22 J.L. & Econ. 351 (1979). See also Victor P.
Goldberg, The InternationalSalt Puzzle, 14 Res. Law & Econ. 31 (1991).
43. InternationalSalt, 332 U.S. at 396.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 394.
46. Id at 396.

47. Id. at 397-98.
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States,48 a case brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 49 the Court
actually held that there was no tie-in involved at all.5" Nevertheless, the
Court went on to articulate vhat it perceived to be the applicable tests of
illegality under both the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Justice Clark wrote:
When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the
"tying" product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the
"tied" product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the
narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because
from either factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is
inferred. And because for even a lawful monopolist it is
"unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market," a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act
whenever both conditions are met. In either case, the arrangement
transgresses § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, since
minimally that section registers violations of the Clayton and
Sherman Acts.5"
The foregoing formulation of tests for the invalidation of tying
arrangements is hardly identical to an articulation of a classic per se rule
and is arguably inconsistent with Internationai Salt. Unlike the
traditional per se approach, requiring only the establishment of the
existence of the offensive restraint, Justice Clark's method of analysis
requires some factual showing of threatened harm to competition to
satisfy even the "incipiency" standard of section 3 of the Clayton Act.
The Court seemed rather clearly to endorse the idea that real proof of
market power would be needed to satisfy the first prong of the test in the
absence of patent or copyright. 2 Market dominance is not a requirement
of a classic per se offense such as price-fixing."
48. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
49. At oral argument, the government explained that it had declined o proceed pursuant to section
3 of the Clayton Act because it did not wish to assume the burden of proving that advertising space
was a commodity for Clayton Act jurisdictional purposes. See Milton Handler et al., Trade
Regulation 699 (3d ed. 1990).
50. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 613-14. The case involved a "unit plan" for advertising that
required purchasers of advertising space to place ads in two paper; or none at all. The Court
determined that advertising space in both the morning and evening newspapers actually constituted a
single product and negated the existence of a tie-in. Id.
51. Id. at 608-09 (footnote and citation omitted).
52. Id. at611.
53. The Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned both horizontal and vertical price fixing as per
se illegal. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-55 (1982);
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 781-83 (1975); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 147-48, 151-53 (1968); United

Tying Arrangements
Further confusion in the development of tie-in doctrine may be
attributed to the next major decision-Northern Pacific Railway v.
United States. 4 This was a section 1 case in which a railroad tied sales
and leases of strategically located land to preferential routing clauses.
More specifically, the railroad required that land transferees ship all
commodities produced on the land over defendant's railroad lines unless
competing lines offered better rates. 5
In affirming summary judgment for the government in Northern
Pacific, the Supreme Court took perhaps its harshest position ever
regarding tying arrangements. Justice Black defined a tie-in as "an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees
that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier. '56 The
Court then indicated that when this occurs "competition on the merits
with respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed" and that "tying
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition."5 7
Justice Black continued by noting that tying
arrangements deny competitors free access to the tied product market,
not because the party imposing the tie has a superior product or a better
price, but because of leverage derived from power in another market.5 8
Further, consumers lose the freedom of choice usually associated with a
truly competitive market."
These comments by the Court suggested heavy reliance on per se
concepts to invalidate tying arrangements. In the same Northern Pacific
opinion, however, Justice Black somewhat contradictorily suggested that
traditional per se analysis was not what the Court had in mind. More
specifically, the Court stated that tie-ins are

States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1960); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213-14 (1951), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 221 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400-03 (1911); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 577 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290,312-13 (1897).
54. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 5-6.
57. Id. at 6 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,305-06 (1911)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and a
"not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is affected ....
Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the
tying product so that it does not represent an effectual weapon to
pressure buyers into taking the tied item any restraint of trade
attributable to such tying arrangements would obviously be
insignificant at most.6"
The Court found the requisite market power present in Northern Pacific
because of the strategic location of the land used as the tying product,
and it also focused upon the large number of tie-ins as evidence of
market power.61 At the same time, however, the Court seemed to give a
broader definition to the notion of market power, as it refused to limit it
to the market dominance or monopoly power concepts articulated in
2
Times-Picayune."
The statement in Northern Pacificthat the requisite power in the tying
product could be deemed to exist despite the absence of market
dominance found more express approval in United States v. Loew's,
Inc.,63 where the Supreme Court found illegal the block booking of
copyrighted feature films for exhibition on television. In Loew 's,
defendants conditioned the license or sale of one or more desired feature
films upon the acceptance of a package of one or more unwanted,
inferior films.' Reiterating earlier doctrine, Justice Goldberg noted that
tie-ins can adversely affect competition by forcing buyers to forgo
substitutes for the tied product, and by also destroying the free access of
competing suppliers of the tied product to consumer. 65

60. Id. at 6-7.
61. Id. at 7-8.
62. See id. at 11, where the Court notes that the requirement of economic power means only
sufficient power to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied product, provided
that a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce is affected. For a relatively narrow reading of
the NorthernPacific decision and commentary regarding its lack of clarity, see Areeda, supra note 3,
1722b, at 288-89 (arguing that different passages within same opinion may point in different
directions and that Northern Pacific does not compel per se condemnation for all tie-ins). For
additional discussion of NorthernPacific,see Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50 (1958).
63. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
64. Id. at 40.
65. Id. at 45.
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The Court then explained that "[e]ven absent a showing of market
dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying
product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its
attributes."' Thus, "It]he requisite economic power is presumed when
the tying product is patented or copyrighted."'67 This conclusion by the
Loeiv's Court shifted the emphasis away from the traditional notion of
market power and substituted uniqueness or distinctiveness as a
sufficient surrogate. Once again, while this is not the equivalent of
deeming all tying arrangements illegal per se, it does push antitrust
doctrine regarding tie-ins sharply in that direction.
3.

The Recent Retreatfrom Per Se Principles-Fortnerand Hyde

Despite the trend favoring harsh treatment for tying arrangements, the
Court began to shy away from repudiation of tie-ins in more recent cases.
After initially reversing a summary judgment for defendants in Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.68 (FortnerI), the Court
ultimately found no per se violation in United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc.6 9 (Former II). Fortner involved a tying
arrangement whereby a seller of prefabricated housing agreed to provide
credit only if the seller's housing was purchased by the borrower. The
desired and allegedly unique financing constituted the tying product, and
the housing was the tied product.7"
In FormerI, the Court provided the impression that it was continuing
the trend towards per se invalidity for tying arrangements. The Court
held that the tie-in affected a not insubstantial amount of commerce in
the tied product, and that plaintiff was entitled to prove that "appreciable
economic power" existed with regard to the tying product.7 ' In Fortner
11, however, the Court ultimately concluded that the financing provided
by defendant was not sufficiently distinct or unique to support a per se
tying claim.72 This began the modem era of tie-in doctrine in the
Supreme Court, and it represented a definite departure from earlier case
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 394 U.S. 495, 510 (1969). For discussions of Former I, see Kenneth W. Dam, Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a BorrowerNor a Lender Be, " 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1;
Milton Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 161, 161-71 (1970).
69. 429 U.S. 610, 622 (1977). For an analysis of Fortner I, see William K. Jones, The Two
FacesofFortner: Comment on a Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 39 (1978).
70. FortnerI 429 U.S. at 613-14; Fortner, 394 U.S. at 498.
71. Fortner , 394 U.S. at 502-03.
72. FortnerII, 429 U.S. at 619-22.
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law. While conceding that the facts in Fortner may be distinguished
from those of cases reaching the opposite result, the spirit of the decision
is clearly representative of a more tolerant attitude for tie-ins.
In Fortner II, the Court chose to read its earlier, more far-ranging
tying opinions rather narrowly. To be sure, the FortnerI1Court did not
expressly repudiate prior cases holding that patents, copyrights, or other
unique attributes could satisfy the requirement of power in the tying
product. Indeed, Justice Stevens clearly noted that the earlier decisions
"do not require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant
position throughout the market for the tying product."'73 But the Court
did emphasize that those earlier cases do "focus attention on the question
whether the seller has the power, within the market fbr the tying product,
to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that
could not be exacted in a completely competitive market."'
Justice Stevens therefore reduced the critical question to "whether the
seller has some advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for
the tying product."75 Rejecting the claim of uniqueness in FortnerII, the
Court concluded that the unusual 100-percent financing offered by
defendant was nothing more than a reflection of its willingness to
provide cheap financing in order to sell expensive: housing.76 Absent
proof of significant cost advantages or evidence that defendant could
if they
provide financing different from what its competitors could offer
77
so chose, plaintiff failed to establish power in the tyiag product.
At first blush, the result in Fortner11 might appear appropriate and
utterly consistent with the conclusions of the tying precedent it purports
to follow. Admittedly, one could look at money as a fungible
commodity and distinguish it from the unique nature of a patented
machine, copyrighted film, or strategically located parcel of land. On the
other hand, a decided consumer preference for the 100-percent financing
offered by defendant was evident, as was the creation of a significant
number of tie-ins. These factors were of importance in earlier cases but
were unpersuasive in Fortner1I. More importantly., the judicial attitude
in FortnerII-an attitude of increased tolerance for tie-ins and a subtle
departure from automatic per se illegality-underscored an evolving
shift in prevailing tie-in doctrine. More specifically, the Court seemed to
73. Id. at 620.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 622.
77. Id.
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turn the clock back to the earliest days of tie-in analysis and signal a
departure from a per se approach and a rejuvenation of a more careful
inspection of the anticompetitive effects of a tie.
The shift in the Supreme Court's general attitude regarding tying
arrangements became strikingly evident in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde. 78 In Hyde, four justices concurred with a five
justice majority and specifically called for a repudiation of any per se
approach to tie-ins.79 These four justices were, in essence, calling for
rule of reason treatment of tie-ins as just another non-price vertical
restraint. Even the majority, which did not wish to repudiate the per se
approach, severely limited its applicability. 0
In Hyde, the alleged tying product was hospital services, and the
alleged tied product was anesthesiological services.8 Every patient
undergoing surgery at East Jefferson Hospital was required to use the
services of a single firm of anesthesiologists.82 Plaintiffs alleged that this
was a per se illegal tie-in and also an illegal exclusive dealing
arrangement. 83 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals'
determination that the arrangement was illegal per se.84 The differing
approaches of the majority and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Hyde reflect just how much uncertainty remained in the area of tie-ins.
Justice Stevens's majority opinion carefully pointed out that "[i]t is far
too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the
proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of
5 In fact,
stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se."'"
the majority opinion noted that this has been the accepted rule since
International Salt and that such an approach was consistent with
congressional policy as expressed in section 3 of the Clayton Act.86
Nevertheless, the Court went on to explain that unlike classic per se
78. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
79. Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall, while joining in the
majority opinion, also wrote a brief, separate concurrence to reiterate support for aperse rule. Id. at
32 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 26-29.
81. Id. at 8.

82. Id. at7.
83. Id. at 2.
84. 686 F.2d 286,292-95 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
85. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 9.
86. Id. at 9-10. The Court recognized that Hyde was not a section 3 case, but Justice Stevens
commented that section 3 reflected Congress's "great concern about the anticompetitive character of
tying arrangements." Id. at 10-I1.
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restraints, tie-ins do not always result in automatic invalidation. The
packaging of two products as part of a single transaction may be
desirable to consumers and does not necessarily distort competitive
forces.87
Justice Stevens explained:
The essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in
the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force
the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either
did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere
on different terms.88
In other words, the buyer must be "forced" to purchase an unwanted tied
product in order to threaten competition in a manner offensive to
antitrust policy. According to Justice Stevens, this forcing can only
occur where the seller "has some special ability-usually called 'market
power'-to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a
competitive market."8 9 Thus, unlike the classic p.er se offense, which
does not require market power to accompany the allegedly illegal
restraint, the Court in Hyde reiterated what may be called a hybrid per se
rule. It endorsed a method of analysis that does not entail all the
elements of a full-blown rule of reason approach, but also does not label
a tie-in illegal without some threshold demonstration of market power in
the tying product.
Justice Stevens distinguished between a seller perhaps lawfully
exploiting market power in a product to raise the price of that same
product, and a seller using that market power to impair competition on
the merits in another product market. In the latter circumstance, "a
potentially inferior product may be insulated from competitive pressures"
in violation of antitrust policy.9" More specifically, existing competitors
could be harmed or entry barriers could be raised to preclude new
competition in the market for the tied product.9' In addition, the tying
arrangement could increase the social costs of market power by
facilitating price discrimination and increasing monopoly profits even
further.92 Freedom of choice for consumers becomes impaired, and

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 14-15.
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market imperfections may cause consumers to disregard price or quality
implications of a tie-in.93
Justice Stevens then noted that per se condemnation of tying
arrangements is only appropriate if there is a probability of forcing
consumers to purchase the tied product from the tying seller to the
detriment of competing sellers of the tied product.94 Because the
application of a per se rule is premised upon the probability of
anticompetitive consequences, the presence of forcing justifies truncated
rather than extensive analysis of the facts and actual procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects.95 This forcing, according to the majority in
Hyde, may occur if the seller has a "patent or similar monopoly" over a
tying product," or "inother situations in which the existence of market
power is probable."97 Such situations include cases where the seller has a
high market share or provides a unique product not offered by its
competitors.9"
Somewhat cryptically, Justice Stevens noted that in the absence of
proof of market power to support a finding of forcing, an antitrust
plaintiff can only prevail by proving the existence of an unreasonable
restraint of trade.99 This statement suggests that even in the absence of
market power in the tying product, a tie-in may still be found to violate
the rule of reason. Left unclear, however, are the elements of a rule of
reason violation in the absence of market power. How could a plaintiff
demonstrate that a tying arrangement has anticompetitive consequences
if there is no market power to force a purchase of the tied product? Are
there surrogates for market power left undisclosed by the Hyde majority
or are all tying claims falling outside the per se rule doomed to fail?
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts in Hyde, the Court
addressed another threshold concern: Did the plaintiff challenge a
practice that was not really a tie-in at all? In other words, did the
hospital services, including anesthesiology, constitute a package
93. Id. at 15.
94. Id. at 15-16. The Court added that foreclosure of a substantial amount of commerce in the
tied product is required to show this probability. Id. at 16. Further, the Court noted that no
anticompetitive consequences would flow from a tie-in requiring the purchase of a second product
which the buyer would ordinarily not have bought even from another seller in the tied product
market. Id.
95. Id.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 17-18.
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representing only one product? In answering this question the Court
stated that the "definitional question depends on whether the
arrangement may have the type of competitive consequences addressed
Thus, the Court focused upon whether there was
by the rule."''
sufficient demand for anesthesiological services separate from demand
for hospital services to justify finding two separate: product markets.'
After finding that consumers do differentiate between hospital services
and anesthesiology, the Court concluded that there were two distinct
products and that a tying arrangement existed.' 0 2
Moving on to the substantive question, the Court found that there was
not sufficient power in the tying product (hospital services) to force
patients to accept the tied product (anesthesiology)." The preference of
some patients for the nearest hospital did not suffice to establish market
power, because seventy percent of the patients residing in Jefferson
Parish entered other hospitals for treatment."° A thirty-percent market
share simply did not satisfy the Hyde majority's test of tying product
market power. The Court also rejected claims that "market
imperfections" buttressed the claim of anticompetitive forcing. 5 Absent
a per se offense, plaintiffs needed to demonstrate actual anticompetitive
record contained
effects to satisfy a rule of reason standard, but 0the
6
insufficient evidence of actual harm to competition."
Complicating matters further in Hyde was the fact that while Justice
O'Connor and three other justices concurred with the majority, they
reached the same result utilizing dramatically different analysis. 0 7
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the O'Connor concurrence in Hyde
was the unequivocal rejection of the per se label for tying arrangements.
Justice O'Connor noted that the Court had never really taken a literal
approach to the alleged per se rule in the tying context, but instead had

100. Id. at 21.
101. Id. at 21-22.
102. Id. at 22-23. The Court noted that patients and surgeons often requested specific
anesthesiologists, that other hospitals allowed separate purchases of such services, that billing was
separate, and that anesthesiologists were not fungible. Id. at 22-24 nn.36 & 39.
103. Id. at 26-29.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 7, 26-27.
Id. at 27-29.
Id. at 29-31.
Id. at 32-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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always required proof of market power or anticompetitive effect."' 8
Thus, the tying cases, in O'Connor's view, always required "elaborate
inquiry" into economic effects and therefore incurred the costs of a fullblown rule of reason analysis without gaining the benefits of its more
comprehensive and time-consuming approach."0 9 As a result, the
misguided use of the per se rule created confusion for lower courts and
led to the invalidation of possibly beneficial arrangements." 0 As an
alternative, Justice O'Connor suggested that:
The time has ... come to abandon the "per se" label and refocus
the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and the potential
economic benefits, that the tie may have. The law of tie-ins will
thus be brought into accord with the law applicable to all other
allegedly anticompetitive economic arrangements, except those few
horizontal or quasi-horizontal restraints that can be said to have no
economic justification whatsoever. This change will rationalize
rather than abandon tie-in doctrine as it is already applied.'
Obviously, this approach to tying arrangements, if adopted by a majority
of the justices, would dramatically shift tie-in doctrine away from the
harsh treatment reflected in earlier case law. Rule of reason scrutiny
would place tie-ins on the same footing as other vertical, non-price
restraints and significantly increase their chances of surviving an
antitrust challenge.
Pursuant to Justice O'Connor's proposed method of analysis, only tieins that have a "demonstrable exclusionary impact" in the market for the
tied product or "abet the harmful exercise of market power" in the tying
product market should be condemned."' Tying can be economically
damaging in "rare cases" where power in the tying product creates
additional market power in the tied product market, thereby foreclosing
competing sellers or raising entry barriers.1
108. Id. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, Justice O'Connor explained that the Court had
never placed tie-ins on the same disfavored footing with "price fixing, division of markets, and other
agreements subject toper se analysis, that... are always illegal." Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 34-35.
111. Id. at 35.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 36-37. Justice O'Connor identified two other possible anticompetitive effects:
avoiding rate regulation and price discrimination. Id. at 36 n.4. For differing discussions of the
"leveraging" concept, whereby a monopolist attempts to extend power from one product market into
another, see Ward S.Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangementsand the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19
(1957); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515
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According to Justice O'Connor, the required anticompetitive effect
can only result if "three threshold criteria" are satisfied: (1) seller power
in the tying product market, (2) a substantial threat of acquiring power in
the tied product market, and (3) a coherent econormc basis for treating
the tying and tied products as distinct' 1 4 Even if all three of these
criteria are met, Justice O'Connor would still not condemn tying
arrangements if their economic benefits outweigh their anticompetitive
effects" 5 -the essence of rule of reason analysis.
Applying these criteria to the facts in Hyde, the four justices in the
O'Connor concurrence adopted an approach different from the majority's
to answer the question of whether one or two products were involved.
Rejecting the majority's "character of demand" test for determining the
presence or absence of separate products, the concurrence found hospital
and anesthesiological services to comprise one indistinguishable product
for purposes of antitrust analysis." 6 Justice O'Connor based this
conclusion on her observation that patients purchase anesthesia in
conjunction with surgical services and would not wish to undergo a
surgical procedure without it." 7 Thus, no additional market power could
be acquired by selling the two services together, and the arrangement
should not affect either the amount of anesthesia provided or the price of
the combined service." 8 Unlike the majority, the O'Connor concurrence
seemed to rely heavily on the functional relationship between the alleged
tying and tied product. Unless the alleged tied product is one which the
buyer might wish to purchase without also buying the tying product,
there is no reason to treat the products as distinct." 9
The far-reaching potential of Justice O'Connor's alternative approach
to market definition, when combined with the more recent changes in
Supreme Court personnel,' should not be overlooked or underestimated.

(1985); Keith K. Wollenberg, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Re-examining the
Leverage Theory, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 737 (1987).
114. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 37-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. Id. at41.
116. Id. at 43.
117. Id.

118. Id.
119. Id.

120. After Hyde and prior to Kodak the membership of the Supreme Court changed significantly.
Chief Justice Burger, as well as Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell, left the Court. These
justices were replaced by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Justices Burger and Powell
joined in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Hyde, while Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the
majority plus reaffirmed in a separate concurrence their support for a per se rule for certain tying
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By adopting an analytical approach more inclined to find that two
separate products are not present, no tying analysis at all would occur.
Rather, the facts would present nothing more than a seller offering to sell
one product at a stated price to a buyer-with no antitrust consequences
whatsoever.
In addition, even though her concurring opinion in Hyde did not rest
its conclusion on the absence of market power in the tying product,
Justice O'Connor made a passing reference to market power that also
threatens to undermine antitrust enforcement against tie-ins. More
specifically, Justice O'Connor noted that courts should not allow the
presence of a patent, copyright, high market share, or uniqueness in the
tying product market to automatically lead them to conclude that the
requisite power exists in the tying product.121 This seemingly innocuous,
footnoted dicta seems to flatly contradict earlier tying decisions and
certainly could form the foundation for an undermining of antitrust
enforcement against tie-ins. One wonders whether it would signal the
beginning of a rule of almost per se validity for tying arrangements.
In sum, the Supreme Court's decision in Hyde, considering the
significantly different methods of analysis between the majority and
O'Connor concurrence, left many important questions open. Would the
per se rule retain any vitality in the context of tying arrangements? If so,
when would it apply? Likewise, the preferred method of determining
whether a tie-in existed at all, that is, whether one or two products were
involved, remained unresolved. The appropriate method of market
power analysis still required definition. Would the presumptions of
market power attributed in earlier cases to sellers with patents,
copyrights, large market shares, or unique products continue? In the
absence of market power, however defined, could a plaintiff establish a
rule of reason offense without proving a per se violation? What role
would quality control and other defenses continue to play in tying
jurisprudence? Would the Court require proof of power in the tied
product market? And, perhaps most importantly, given the subsequent
changes in Supreme Court personnel, would the concurring opinion in
Hyde evolve into the prevailing doctrine of the future?"2

arrangements. Id. at 32 (Brennan, J., concurring). The appointment of four relatively conservative
jurists after the decision in Hyde certainly left open the possibility that Justice O'Connor's
alternative approach might muster majority support.
121. Id. at 37-38 n.7.
122. For discussions of Hyde and its uncertain implications for tying jurisprudence, see Areeda,
supranote 3, 1722b, at 289-91 (noting that language of decision is "not fully transparent"). See
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In the interim between Hyde and Kodak, lower federal courts
struggled to apply Hyde and to reconcile it with earlier tying cases.
Commentators also focused on the decision and took various approaches
to the problem of antitrust treatment of tying arrangements. Opinions
ranged from one extreme to another-from support for retention of aper
It was
se rule to proposed per se validity for tying arrangements.1
hoped that when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Kodak case it
would put to rest many of the burning questions, and provide real
guidance to lower courts, practitioners, and scholars. Unfortunately,
however, the Kodak decision did little to eliminate the considerable
uncertainty left by Hyde. If anything, the Kodak decision raises more
questions than it answers.
III. THE KODAK DECISION-BREAKING NEW ANTITRUST
GROUND OR A NARROW, PROCEDURAL HOLDING?
A.

The Salient Facts andKey Issues

On June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals'
reversal of summary judgment for defendant in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc.'24 The plaintiffs/respondents in Kodak
were eighteen independent service organizations (ISOs), and the
defendant/petitioner (Kodak) was a manufacturer and distributor of
photocopiers and micrographic equipment.125 After the ISOs began
servicing Kodak equipment in the early 1980s, Kodak adopted policies to
limit the availability of spare parts to ISOs and to make it more difficult
126
for ISOs to compete with Kodak in the servicing of Kodak equipment.
According to the record, Kodak equipment was complex and unique:
some software programs that operated on Kodak :machines were not
compatible with competitors' machines, Kodak parts were not

also Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Arrangements:Amitrust as History, 69 Minn.
L. Rev. 1013, 1063 (1985) (describing Hyde as "another swing in judicial attitude on the validity of
tying arrangements").
123. For commentary favoring rejection of a per se rule, see Carson W. Bays, Tying
Arrangements Should Be Per Se Legal, 26 Am. Bus. L.J. 625 (1989). For a response, see Arnold
Celnicker, A Response to Carson W. Bays's Callfor PerSe Legality of Tying Arrangements,28 Am.
Bus. L.J. 145 (1990). For an earlier proposal leaning towards the per se rule, see Joseph P. Bauer, A
Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements:A Legal andEconomic Anaysis, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 283
(1980).
124. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
125. Id. at 2076.
126. Id.
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compatible with other manufacturers' equipment, and vice-versa. 2 7
Kodak provided both spare parts and service for its machines to its
customers.2 8 Some of the spare parts Kodak manufactured itself, and
independent original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) produced
others. 129 It was not Kodak's policy to sell a complete system of original
equipment, lifetime service, and spare parts for one price. 3 ' Instead,
Kodak provided service after the expiration of the initial warranty period
either through annual service contracts (which included parts) or on a
per-call basis.' Different customers paid different prices for equipment,
parts, and service, and Kodak provided
eighty to ninety-five percent of
32
the service for its own machines.
Beginning in the early 1980s, ISOs began to provide a competitive
alternative for Kodak equipment customers by repairing and servicing
Kodak machines, selling parts, and reconditioning and selling used
Kodak equipment.'33 The ISOs enjoyed the patronage of federal, state,
and local government agencies and other major users of Kodak
equipment because they provided better service at prices lower than
Kodak's. 34 Some of these users bought their own parts and utilized ISO
service only; others expected the ISOs to provide both parts and
service. 3 To accommodate customers requiring both service and parts,
the ISOs kept an inventory of parts purchased from Kodak, OEMs, or
136
other sources.
In an effort to combat the growing competition from the ISOs, during
the mid-1980s Kodak implemented a policy of selling replacement parts
only to buyers of Kodak equipment who either used Kodak service or
repaired their own machines. 37 In support of this new policy, Kodak
also tried to prevent ISOs from acquiring Kodak parts from other
sources. Kodak agreed with the OEMs that the OEMs would not sell
Kodak parts to anyone but Kodak. 38 Further, Kodak pressured Kodak
127. Id. at 2077.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2078.
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equipment owners and independent parts distributors not to sell Kodak
parts to ISOs. 3 9
As a result of these policy changes, ISOs were unable to obtain Kodak
replacement parts and could not provide service for Kodak machines.140
Many ISOs were driven out of business, and others lost large amounts of
revenue. 4 ' Users of ISO service were compelled to switch to more
expensive, less desirable Kodak service for Kodak equipment. 142 In
response to Kodak's practices, the ISOs filed a federal antitrust suit,
alleging that Kodak had illegally tied the sale of service for Kodak
machines to the sale of replacement parts in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 143 In addition, the ISOs alleged that Kodak's policies
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act as an attempt to monopolize and
actual monopolization of the service market for Kodak machines. 44
B.

The DistrictCourt and Court of-Appeals Decisions

After limited discovery and without a hearing, the district court
granted summary judgment for Kodak. The trial court found no tying
arrangement to exist 4 and also rejected the secti.on 2 claim on the
ground that a unilateral refusal to deal on the foregoing facts did not
constitute an antitrust violation. 46 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
by a 2 to 1 vote, reversed the entry of summary judgment, 147 finding
genuine issues of fact as to whether service and parts constituted separate
markets and whether a tying arrangement existed between them.14 ' The
court of appeals went on to consider a question not addressed in the
lower court: whether a material fact issue existed regarding Kodak's
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Although the section 2 issues raised in Kodak are quite important, this Article focuses
upon the implications of the decision for tying jurisprudence. Insofar as.the section 1 and section 2
issues both involve questions of market definition and market power, the discussion of section I will
necessarily involve questions relevant to the section 2 issue. However, no detailed examination of
the effects of Kodak on the law of attempted or actual monopolization will be undertaken.
145. Id. According to Justice Blackmun, the district court found no tie-in between Kodak
equipment and service or parts. However, the trial court failed to address the issue of a tie-in
between Kodak parts and service-the issue upon which the Supreme Court focused because that
was the tie alleged by plaintiffs. Id.
146. Id.
147. 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
148. Id. at 615-16.
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economic power in the parts market (tying product) to appreciably
restrain competition in the service market (tied product) 4 9 While
agreeing with Kodak that the absence of market power in the equipment
market might preclude Kodak from enjoying power in the parts market,
the court of appeals refused to uphold the granting of summary judgment
on this purely theoretical basis because market imperfections could cause
consumers' actual behavior to differ from economic theory.15 Because
the trial court had not addressed the market power question, and because
discovery below had been limited, the Ninth Circuit did not require the
ISOs to conduct market analysis or to specify market imperfections to
survive a summary judgment motion. Rather, it was sufficient that the
ISOs had presented evidence of actual events which could lead a
reasonable fact finder to conclude that market power existed in the parts
market even if it were absent in the equipment market.'
The court of appeals also addressed Kodak's three alleged business
justifications for its change in policy: (1) prevention of substandard
service, (2) lowering of inventory costs, and (3) prevention of ISO freeriding on Kodak's investment in the copier and micrographic industry.
The court ruled that a trier of fact might find the first two alleged
justifications "pretextual" and held that Kodak's quality goals could be
achieved using less restrictive alternatives.52 The Ninth Circuit also
found Kodak's third purported justification for its policy to be legally
inadequate. 153 The Ninth Circuit majority therefore concluded that
enough evidence had been presented to withstand a motion for summary
judgment.

149. Id. at 616.
150. Id. at 617.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 618-19.
153. Id. at 619. The court of appeals also addressed the section 2 claim, holding that there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the parts policy was anticompetitive and exclusionary
and also reflected a specific intent to monopolize. Id. at 620. In sharp contrast, the dissent accepted
Kodak's argument that the absence of power in the equipment market necessarily precluded market
power in the derivative parts market. Id. at 622 (Wallace, J., dissenting). With respect to the section
2 claim, the dissent accepted Kodak's first business justification and concluded that this alone
supported summary judgment for Kodak. Id. at 623.
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Against this factual and legal background, the Supreme Court
affirmed by a 6 to 3 vote. 4 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
began his analysis by noting that tying arrangements violate section 1 of
the Sherman Act if the seller has appreciable economic power in the
tying product and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of
commerce in the tied product market. 5 Kodak did not dispute that the
second prong of the legal standard had been satisfied; Kodak did,
and that there was no
however, argue that no tying arrangement 5existed
6
market power in any alleged tying product.
Because analysis of the market power question would be unnecessary
regarding the section 1 tying claim if, in fact, no tying arrangement was
presented, Justice Blackmun first considered whether a reasonable fact
finder could conclude that service and replacement parts were two
distinct products and whether their sale had been tied. 57 Relying upon
the majority rather than the concurrence in Hyde, the Court applied the
character of demand approach to the question and asked whether there
was sufficient consumer demand "so that it is efficient for a firm to
'
The record reflected the fact
provide service separately from parts."158
that Kodak had sold parts and service separately in the past and
continued to sell parts separately to self-service equipment owners.
Further, the Court deemed the evolution of a high technology service
industry probative regarding the efficiency benefits of a separate service
market. 59

154. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
155. Id. at 2079.
156. Id
157. Id. at 2079-80.
158. Id. at 2080.
159. Id. The Court also focused upon the numerous amicus briefs filed by service organizations
to underscore the magnitude of the service industry. Id. at 2080 n.6. It should also be recognized
that others submitted amicusbriefs in support of the ISOs. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Public
Citizen in Support of Respondents; Brief Amicus Curiae of Grumman Corporation in Support of
Respondents; Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of State Purchasing Officials and National
Institute of Governmental Purchasing, Inc., in Support of Respondents; Brief for State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company, Nationwide Insurance, Government
Employees Insurance Company, United Services Automobile Association, Alliance of American
Insurers, and National Association of Independent Insurers, as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents; Brief of Amicus Curiae States of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
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Kodak argued that because there was no demand for parts separate
from service, it followed that there could not be separate parts and
service markets. 6 ' Justice Blackmun rejected this contention, however,
noting that functionally linked products which are useless without the
In addition, the
other can still be the subject of tying arrangements.'
majority challenged the accuracy of Kodak's factual contentions,
observing that some consumers will buy service without replacement
parts because some service does not require parts. Conversely, selfservice customers will buy parts without requesting service.' 62 Given the
foregoing, summary judgment was an inappropriate method of resolving
this disputed material fact question of market definition. 63 The majority
then gave short shrift to the argument that no tie existed: the refusal to
sell parts to third parties unless they agreed to avoid ISO service
sufficed.' 6
After dealing with these threshold issues, Justice Blackmun turned to
the most critical element of tie-in litigation: "appreciable economic
power in the tying [product] market." 65 The majority defined market
power as the ability to force purchasers to "do something that [they]
would not do in a competitive market."' 66 Justice Blackmun explained
that on other occasions the Court had defined market power as the ability
to raise price and restrict output, and ordinarily had inferred market
power from possession of a "predominant share of the market."' 67
Applying these definitions to the facts, the Court acknowledged that
the ISOs were contending that Kodak had sufficient power in the parts
market to force purchasers of parts to accept unwanted service. 68 This
power was derived from the fact that certain parts could only be obtained

Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia, in Support of Respondents.
160. Kodak, 112 S.Ct. at 2080.
161. Id. Justice Blackmun cited the examples of cameras and film, automobiles and tires, and
computers and software. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The Court rejected Kodak's claim that plaintiffs alleged only a unilateral refusal to deal.
Even if Kodak's refusal to sell parts to service organizations were unilateral, it could not properly
characterize its sales to third parties, conditioned on their purchase of Kodak service, as a mere
unilateral refusal to deal. Id. at 2080 n.8.
165. Id. at2080.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2080-81.
168. Id. at2081.
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from Kodak, while others were subject to Kodak's restrictive policy
regarding parts it did not manufacture. More specifically, Kodak had
allegedly prohibited independent manufacturers from selling Kodak parts
to ISOs, pressured Kodak equipment owners and. independent parts
distributors to deny ISOs Kodak parts, and taken other steps to limit the
availability of used machines. 169 The ISOs contended that through these
practices Kodak excluded service competition, raised service prices, and
compelled consumers to accept unwanted service from Kodak. 70
Consumers allegedly switched to Kodak service despite their preference
for lower priced, higher quality ISO service, and ISOs were driven out of
business by these practices.' Thus, the evidence submitted by the ISOs
to support the foregoing assertions was sufficient to withstand a
summary judgment motion."
Kodak argued that even if it did have a monopoly share of an alleged
parts market, the conceded high level of competition in the equipment
market precluded any exercise of market power.'73 Kodak asserted that
the presence of competition in the equipment market, causing consumers
to shift to equipment manufacturers with more: attractive service
packages, would thwart any attempt to exercise putative market power in
the parts market by raising prices for parts and services. 74 This
threatened loss of profits in the equipment market would prevent Kodak
from attempting to increase profits by exploiting any perceived power in
the parts market. Based upon this economic theory, and in the absence
of specific data on the equipment, parts, or service markets, Kodak
asserted that the competitive equipment market necessarily precluded
any real power in an aftermarket and supported summary judgment in its
favor. 75 The majority, however, declined to oblige Kodak.
Justice Blackmun responded to Kodak's highly theoretical argument
by first emphasizing the Court's preference for a case-by-case fact

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Court declined the ISOs' invitation to examine the question of market power in the
equipment market. Instead, the Court reached its decision "based on the same premise as the Court
of Appeals, namely, that competition exists in the equipment market." la. at 2081 n.10.
174. Id. at 2081-82.
175. Id. at 2082. Justice Blackmun explained that Kodak argued for a per se approach; that is, the
ISOs would be precluded from even attempting to rebut the conclusion that no market power could
exist in the parts market. Id. at 2082 n. 11. The federal government, acting as an amicus, took a
position that would have allowed the ISOs to attempt to rebut this "economic reasoning." Id.
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intensive approach: "Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic
distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in
antitrust law."'76 The Court would require actual proof of cross-elasticity
of demand or its absence, not mere economic theory. Consequently, the
majority rejected Kodak's reliance on the Court's approval of summary
judgment for defendants in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.177 by distinguishing that decision and taking a rather narrow
view of its implications. More specifically, the majority noted that
Matsushita did not create any "special burden" on antitrust plaintiffs
opposing a motion for summary judgment. While Matsushita does
require that a plaintiff's claim make "economic sense," it does not stand
for the proposition that defendants advancing any economic theory in
178
support of their conduct could win a motion for summary judgment.
Rather, Justice Blackmun interpreted Matsushita to require "only that the
nonmoving party's inferences be reasonable in order to reach the jury,"
that was "economically senseless" and subject to
as opposed to a theory
17
1
disposition.
summary
Applying this reasonableness standard to the record in Kodak, the
Court attempted to "unravel the factual assumptions underlying
[Kodak's] proposed rule that lack of power in the equipment market
necessarily precludes power in the aftermarkets.""' Focusing on the
issue of cross-elasticity and rejecting Kodak's assertion that nothing
could be gained from attempts to exploit power in the aftermarkets, the
Court noted that "[e]ven if Kodak could not raise the price of service and
parts one cent without losing equipment sales, that fact would not
disprove market power in the aftermarkets." ms'
The majority correctly recognized that even a true monopolist loses
some sales when it charges supercompetitive prices; however, the lower
volume of sales does not change the fact that the fewer, higher-priced

176. Id. at 2082.
177. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). In Matsushita, a number of American corporations manufacturing or
selling consumer electronic products alleged that Japanese competitors had engaged in a 20-year
predatory pricing conspiracy. The Court found that the theory advanced by plaintiffs made no
economic sense and that it was unlikely that defendants would sustain losses for so long without
foreseeable recoupment. Consequently, summary judgment for defendants was appropriate. Id. at
587-88,594-98.
178. Kodak 112 S. Ct. at 2083.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2084.
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sales yield a monopolist's profit-maximizing return.182 Accordingly, the
Court rejected Kodak's "false dichotomy" of either a competitive price
or a ruinous one, and it recognized that Kodak could choose an
"optimum" price that would allow supercompetitive prices for parts and
service to more than compensate for losses in equipment sales revenue.'83
Some restraining effect by the equipment market on The parts and service
markets did not preclude a finding of power in those markets, and
Kodak's economic theory was therefore not irrefutable.'84
The majority then considered what it termed "the more narrowly
drawn question: Does Kodak's theory describe actual market behavior so
accurately that [the ISOs'] assertion of Kodak market power in the
aftermarkets, if not impossible, is at least unreasonable?"' 85 Responding
in the negative, Justice Blackmun emphasized that despite Kodak's
economic theories, the record reflected that while service prices for
Kodak customers had risen as a result of Kodak's practices, the evidence
reflected no reduction in Kodak equipment sales. 8 6 Both Kodak and the
United States, as amicus curiae, attempted to explain away this result,
but the Court would have none of it.
Kodak argued that it could charge equipment buyers subcompetitive
prices while simultaneously charging high prices for service, resulting in
an overall competitive price spread over time.'87 This theory, however,
found no support in the record, as Kodak had never claimed to recoup
low equipment profits from higher priced service. Rather, Kodak had
asserted that it sought profits in both equipment and service and priced
its equipment comparably to its competition.'88 Further, Kodak's
policies towards self-service customers contradict.d its assertions; if
equipment were underpriced, Kodak could not afford to sell parts
without service to those users.'
The actual market behavior in which
Kodak engaged did not fit its own economic theory.

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2085. Justice Blackmun noted that if Kodak's economic theories were correct, one
might have expected Kodak to take advantage of lower ISO service prices to expand sales of
equipment. Id. However, Kodak instead adopted the restrictive policies: challenged by the ISOs and
tried to eliminate lower-priced service. This, according to the Court, was "an act that would be
expected to devastate either Kodak's equipment sales or Kodak's faith in its theory." Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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The ISOs offered their own "forceful reason" to explain why Kodak's
economic theory might prove inconsistent with economic reality. In
markets for complex durable goods, significant information and
switching costs could limit the responsiveness of equipment buyers to
parts and service price increases. 9
If increases in the cost of
replacement parts and service are to affect the demand for equipment,
prospective purchasers must know the total package costs. That is, at the
time of purchase, buyers must engage in "accurate lifecycle pricing." 91
For complex durable equipment, however, it is both difficult and
expensive to engage in lifecycle pricing, as the relevant information
often may be impossible to acquire or very customer specific.192
Kodak responded to this lifecycle pricing argument by suggesting that
consumers' information needs would be satisfied by the presence of
competitors in the equipment market. The Court stated, however, that
fulfillment of information needs was a question of fact.1 93 It was not
undisputed that competitors either could or would be inclined to provide
the necessary information. 94 Further, consumers might choose to avoid
the expense of acquiring the information or find it difficult to compute
the complete cost of a package at the time of initial purchase. 9 The
Court also rejected Kodak's contention that a few large and sophisticated
buyers would engage in the necessary information gathering and thus
protect other consumers. Kodak could either let the few knowledgeable
buyers go elsewhere, or it could engage in price discrimination by
varying prices on its packages to continue exploiting the uninformed. 96
The Court was therefore unwilling to accept the bald proposition that
equipment purchasing decisions reflected an accurate assessment of
lifecycle costs.' 97

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2085-86. The Court noted that a buyer would need data regarding price, quality, and
product availability for upgrades, service and repair cost information, estimates of breakdown
frequency, as well as a variety of other facts. Id. at 2085, 2085 n.20.
193. Id. at2086.
194. Id.
195. Id. The Court noted that for some consumers it may not be cost-efficient to compile the
information. For others, such as government entities with unique purchasing systems, it may be
impossible to engage in lifecycle pricing because operating expenses and capital expenses may be
handled by different departments. Id.
196. Id. at 2086-87.
197. Id. at 2087.
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The Court then focused on the ISOs' evidence that Kodak did price
discriminate by selling parts to high volume self-service users while
refusing to sell parts to smaller volume users employing the ISOs.' 9 ' The
high volume users were most likely to be the ones in possession of
needed information costs. Further, the majority noted that some
equipment purchasers were "locked-in" because of high switching costs,
and they were better off accepting somewhat higher service costs if these
costs were lower than the cost of switching to another brand of
equipment.99 As a result, a seller could profitably pursue a strategy of
supercompetitive pricing for parts and service if switching costs
exceeded the higher service costs and if the number of locked-in
customers was high relative to the number of new purchasers. 2" This
strategy is enhanced if Kodak could price discriminate between the
locked-in customers and new patrons.20' Importantly, the ISOs had
presented evidence of high switching costs, and Kodak itself confirmed
significant variances in package prices for Kodak equipment, parts, and
service." 2 The majority concluded that plaintiffs raised a fact question
regarding the impact of information and switching costs on defendant's
assumption that a competitive equipment market precludes a finding of
power in aftermarkets.2 3
All of the foregoing led the majority inexorably to the conclusion that
the ISOs' inferences of market power in the parts and service markets
were not unreasonable. Further, as the ISOs had presented evidence of
power in these aftermarkets, and because the ISOs' baeory regarding the
misuse of this power made economic sense, surmmary judgment for
Kodak was inappropriate.2°4 The Court rejected Kodak's reliance on
Matsushita for the proposition that denial of summary judgment
threatened to deter procompetitive behavior. Unlike Matsushita, which
involved an arguably beneficial lowering of prices, Kodak contained
allegations of conduct designed to raise prices and foreclose markets." 5
Although Kodak alleged that its marketing strategies actually enhanced
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2087-88. The Court stated that it was plausible to infer that Kodak had chosen to
profit immediately from its market power through price discrimination that exploited locked-in
customers with high information costs. Id. at 2088.
205. Id.
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competition,0 6 the Court responded by stating that this was not entirely
clear and that a trier of fact would have to decide that question:
We need not decide whether Kodak's behavior has any
procompetitive effects and, if so, whether they outweigh the
anticompetitive effects. We note only that Kodak's service and
parts policy is simply not one that appears always or almost always
to enhance competition, and therefore to warrant a legal
presumption without any evidence of its actual economic impact.
In this case, when we weigh the risk of deterring procompetitive
behavior by proceeding to trial against the risk that illegal behavior
go unpunished, the balance tips against summary judgment.0 7
Although this Article focuses primarily upon the tying claims asserted
against Kodak by the ISOs, it is nevertheless significant to note that the
ISOs' section 2 claims of actual and attempted monopolization of the
parts and service markets also survived Kodak's summary judgment
motion."' Some of the observations made in the context of the Court's
section 2 discussion are also relevant to the resolution of the tying claims
and are quite important for antitrust jurisprudence in general. While the
Court acknowledged that "[m]onopoly power under § 2 requires . . .
something greater than market power under § 1,"' 29 it nevertheless found
the evidence that Kodak controlled nearly 100 percent of the parts
market and eighty to ninety-five percent of the service market sufficient
to survive summary judgment."' Significantly, the Court flatly rejected
Kodak's claim that a single brand of a product or service may never
constitute a relevant market. Instead, the majority concluded that "[t]he
relevant market for antitrust purposes is determined by the choices
available to Kodak equipment owners. 2 1 ' Recognizing that narrow
market definitions have been approved in other antitrust cases, the Court
utilized the reasonable interchangeability standard and noted that the
"commercial realities" facing Kodak equipment owners could well

206. The Court recognized that competition could be enhanced by a firm offering innovative
package plans. For example, lower equipment prices coupled with higher parts and service prices
could facilitate initial financing and thereby increase sales. The elimination of parts and service
options, however, did not necessarily further any procompetitive scheme. Id.
207. Id. at 2088-89 (citation omitted).
208. Id. at 2089-92.
209. Id. at 2090.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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narrow the parts and service markets. 212 The implications of this
approach to market definition could be quite profound, not only in
section 2 litigation, but also in tying and other section 1 cases where
market definition and market power may bet the critical and
determinative issues."'
While concluding that the foregoing analysis made summary
judgment inappropriate, the Court did acknowledge that after trial all of
Kodak's assertions might prove to have merit. 214 That is, it left open the
possibility that a trier of fact might conclude thai parts, service, and
equipment were "components of one unified market," that the equipment
market did affect pricing in the aftermarkets, or that Kodak's policies
were actually procompetitive.215
Consequently, the scope of the
majority's decision could prove to be rather narrow and its impact more
procedural than substantive."'
2.

The Dissent

Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas,
painted a very different picture of the ISO-Kodak dispute and
2 17
emphasized the substantive implications of the majority's decision.
The dissenters framed the dispositive question as:
Whether, for purposes of applying our per se rule condemning
"ties," and for purposes of applying our exacting rules governing
the behavior of would-be monopolists, a manufacturer's conceded
lack of power in the interbrand market for its equipment is
somehow consistent with its possession of "market," or even
212. Id. The Court went on to explore the conduct element of the section 2 offense: willfil
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, as distinguished from growth or development as a
result of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. .d. at 2090-92. The Court
needed to determine whether Kodak's actions reflected valid business judgment or were simply
exclusionary in nature. Id. at 2091. After examining Kodak's proffered justifications for its
policies, the Court determined that factual questions existed regarding the validity of these alleged
justifications. Id. Kodak argued that its policies allowed it to stress the quality of its service, to
reduce inventory costs, and to prevent ISO free-riding on Kodak's capital investment. Id.
Nonetheless, the Court found that the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence to raise a triable issue
as to whether the alleged justifications were merely pretextual. Thus, the section 2 conduct question
was not susceptible to resolution on a summary judgment motion. Id. at 2092.
213. See infra notes 258-69 and accompanying text.
214. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2092.
215. Id.
216. See discussioninfra part r.E.
217. Kodak; 112 S. Ct. at 2092-2101 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Ju.'tice Scalia admonished the
majority for treating Kodak as just another case regarding the standard fbr summary judgment in the
antitrust context. Id. at 2092.
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"monopoly," power in wholly derivative aftermarkets for that
equipment. In my view, the Court supplies an erroneous answer to
this question, and I dissent.21
Although the majority had nowhere in its opinion specifically referred to
Kodak as aper se tying case, Justice Scalia pointed out that the ISOs had
waived any rule of reason argument in the court of appeals and were
therefore limited to arguing for per se treatment of the challenged tiein."' Accordingly, Justice Scalia treated it as such and proceeded to
examine the traditional rationale advanced for per se invalidation of
some restraints of trade. Justice Scalia noted:
Per se rules of antitrust illegality are reserved for those situations
where logic and experience show that the risk of injury to
competition... is so pronounced that it is needless and wasteful to
conduct the usual judicial inquiry into the balance between the
behavior's procompetitive benefits and its anticompetitive costs."
According to the dissent, in the tying context a demonstration of
defendant's market power in the tying product satisfies this prerequisite
for per se illegality." When a defendant possesses such power, a tie
may facilitate extension of that power into other markets, thereby
increasing entry barriers in both the tying and tied product markets.'
On this question, the majority and dissent in Kodak were in substantial
accord.
Similarly, the dissent noted that section 2 monopolization doctrine
also requires market power in combination with exclusionary or
predatory behavior prior to any finding of an antitrust violation.2
Absent market power, with its potential for coercion and market
exclusion, neither the section 1 nor the section 2 claim advanced in
Kodak made any sense to the dissent. Of course, the absence of any
market power would have led the majority inexorably to the same
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2094 (citing Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 615
n.1 (9th Cir. 1990)).
220. Id. at 2092-93.
221. Id. at 2093. Justice Scalia did, however, recognize that some courts have accepted
affirmative defenses to otherwise invalid ties. Id. No real effort was made to reconcile this apparent
conflict between the per se concept and judicial practice.
222. Id. Referring to Justice White's dissenting opinion in Fortner I the dissent noted that
despite academic criticism of the Court's per se rule for tying, ties can facilitate evasion of price
controls, effect price discrimination, and force a full line of products on customers in order to extract
monopoly profits on a unique product in the line. Id.
223. Id. at 2093-94.
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conclusion. The critical difference between the majority and dissent in
Kodak however, was their diametrically opposed views regarding the
fundamental issue of market power.
Justice Scalia began his discussion of the market power question by
"assuming" that Kodak lacked either market or monopoly power "in the
interbrand markets for its micrographics and photocopying
equipment." 4 It seemed logical to the dissent that this absence of
market power in the equipment market necessitated a similar finding
regarding the aftermarkets in parts and service.' If no per se illegality
could be attributed to a tie involving the equipment market because of
the absence of market power, it made no sense to the dissent to treat a
tying arrangement involving only parts and service any differently. If
"bundling" of equipment and parts and service would escape per se
treatment, it seemed "anomalous" to the dissent to treat a bundling of just
dissent
parts and service for that equipment another way.z 6 The
' ' n7
regarded both scenarios as "economically similar phenomena.
Justice Scalia argued that the ISOs recognized that a tying claim
involving equipment would fail, so they instead zeroed in on an
aftermarket where Kodak "unquestionably held a near-monopoly share:8
the parts uniquely associated with Kodak's brand of machines."
Nevertheless, the dissent concluded that this was riot a proper antitrust
concern because virtually every producer of durable goods requiring
aftermarket support with relatively unique goods will find itself similarly
situated. 229 It seemed "quite wrong" to the dissent to endorse an
approach which attributed market power in these situations because
many manufacturers facing intense interbrand competition for their
224. Id. at 2094. Justice Scalia explained that the ISOs had originally alleged an illegal tie
between equipment and parts and service. Id. at 2094-95. Despite the ISOs' decision to abandon
that claim, the dissent analyzed it and determined that it was bound to fail because no per se tying
claim could succeed where the alleged tying product (equipment) was one in which market power
was absent. Kodak would have lacked the ability to force purchasers of its equipment to accept
unwanted parts and service, and the presence of interbrand alternatives in the equipment market
would have prevented any anticompetitive consequences. Id. at 2095.
225. Id. at 2096.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. The majority addressed this idea of an inherent aftermarket monopoly in a lengthy
footnote and rejected the idea that perse immunity should be afforded to such a "vast and growing
sector of the economy." Id. at 2089 n.29. The majority viewed Justice Scalia's approach as a
"radical departure" from existing doctrine, and also noted that a serious question existed as to the
Court's authority to make such a policy decision. Id. Further, the majority found the dissent's
theory to be "mere conjecture" given the procedural posture of the case. Id.
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products would nevertheless be deemed to have some degree of market
power in an aftermarket.aso Justice Scalia felt that the competitive
concerns to which tying doctrine addresses itself would not be implicated
in these cases."
Further, the dissent argued that control of a single-brand derivative
market would not connote power to raise derivative market prices
through output limitation. This followed from the notion that rational
consumers interested in Kodak products would necessarily factor into
their purchasing decisions the lifecycle costs of ownership and
operation.Y32 The presence of interbrand equipment competition would
chill the ability of Kodak to exploit any advantage in the aftermarkets. 3
The dissent also dismissed the majority's reliance on information
costs to support a denial of summary judgment. Justice Scalia used the
term "truism" and argued that while gaps in consumer information
pervade markets they do not create true market power234 He also
rejected the locked-in consumer theory discussed by the majority
because even if there were some locked-in consumers, Kodak could not
afford to lose additional equipment sales to potential purchasers who
observed its conduct in the aftermarkets." 5 Justice Scalia termed the
leverage that Kodak might have over some customers as "circumstantial"
and not significant for assessing any relevant market power. z 6 Thus,
despite the majority's observation that narrow market definitions have
received judicial approval on occasion, the dissent flatly stated: "We
have never before accepted the thesis the Court today embraces: that a
seller's inherent control over the unique parts for its own brand amounts

230. Id.
231. Id. at 2096-97.
232. Id. at 2097.
233. Id. Justice Scalia acknowledged that some purchasers may be "irrational" and therefore fail
to consider long term expense as well as original equipment costs. Regardless, he noted that the
Court had "never before premised the application of antitrust doctrine on the lowest common
denominator of consumer." Id.
234. Id. at 2097-98. Justice Scalia conceded that some consumers will make "rough cut"
judgments about price, creating "zones" within which otherwise competitive suppliers may overprice
products without appreciable loss of market share. Nevertheless, he rejected the idea that "bands of
apparent consumer indifference" result in power in the overall market. Id.
235. Id. at 2093.
236. Id.
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to 'market power' of a character sufficient to permit invocation of the per
se rule against tying." 7
In sum, the dissent focused upon the deterrent effects of interbrand
competition on any attempt to exploit intrabrand market power. Further,
Justice Scalia speculated about the potential procompetitive benefits to
be derived from bundling of goods and services: protection of the
equipment's quality and performance to preserve manufacturer goodwill,
creation of financing options, and promotion of product improvement."
The dissent's determination that market power was absent in Kodak was
also dispositive of any section 2 claim advanced by the ISOs. 9
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF KODAK-UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
AND UNCERTAIN IMPACT ON PRECEDENT
Many had hoped that Kodak would clarify antitrust doctrine regarding
tying arrangements by resolving some fundamental questions. Instead,
the opinions in Kodak perhaps raise more issues than they resolve.24 °
The uncertainty engendered by the Court's decision may also have

significant implications for other areas of antitrast law where basic
questions regarding the appropriate method of analysis, market
definition, and the role of market power may be critical.

237. Id. at 2099. Justice Scalia distinguished this from a situatiorn where the per se rule could
apply to a tie involving the use of market power in the foremarket to force purchases in an
aftermarket as a means of exploiting interbrand power. Id.
238. Id. at 21O0-01.
239. Id. at 2101.
240. Some commentary on Kodak and its implications for the future of antitrust doctrine has
already emerged. See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antirust Law 1709, at 1161-83
(Supp. 1992) (summarizing and critiquing the majority and dissenting opinions); Michael S. Jacobs,
MarketPower Through ImperfectInformation: The StaggeringImplicationsof Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Services and a Modest Proposalfor Limiting Their, 52 Md. L. Rev. 336, 348-66
(1993) (suggesting that Kodak inappropriately revolutionizes antitrust doctrine and radically alters
market power analysis); Lawrence T. Festa, III, Comment, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc.: The Decline and Fallof the ChicagoEmpire? 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 619, 623-25 &
nn.18-21 (1993) (noting the varied reactions to Kodak and its potential effects on the future of
antitrust jurisprudence). For more recent discussion, see George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or
Half-Full:Reflections on the Kodak Case, 62 Antitrust L.J. 177 (1993); Herbert Hovenkamp, Market
Powerin Aflermarkets: Antitrust Policyand the Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1447 (1993); Robert
H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a CrucialRole in the
Post-Kodak World, 62 Antitrust L.J 193 (1993); Gordon B. Spivac & Carolyn T. Ellis, Kodak:
EnlightenedAntitrust Analysis and Traditional Tying Law, 62 Antitrust L.J. 203 (1993); Jill Dickey
Protos, Comment, Kodak v. Image Technical Services: A Setbackfor te Chicago School ofAntitrust
Analysis, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1199 (1993).
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A.

Per Se or Rule of Reason Analysisfor Tie-Ins?

This Article has already traced the somewhat uncertain path of
antitrust doctrine regarding tying arrangements.24 It was observed that
the Court moved decidedly towards classic per se analysis without ever
actually applying it in the manner reserved for restraints such as pricefixing. More recently, the Court began to shy away from reflexive
invalidation of tie-ins but continued to apply a hybrid or quasi-per se
approach that resulted in such restraints withstanding antitrust scrutiny.
As the classic per se rule is usually reserved for restraints which
almost always would fail to survive closer rule of reason analysis,242 and
because the classic approach does not generally require any elaborate
analysis of market definition, market power, and other elements
associated with full-blown rule of reason standards, the notion of aperse
concept in the tying area has always been somewhat puzzling. Yet, for
nearly a century the Court has treated tie-ins as per se illegal if certain
conditions are satisfied. Kodak presented the Court with an opportunity
to pick up on the concurrence by Justice O'Connor in Hyde and its
suggestion to abandon the per se label in the tying context and replace it
with rule of reason analysis. After all, as Justice O'Connor had
recognized, the hybrid per se approach required some fairly elaborate
inquiry into the facts but fell short of considering all relevant matters that
would necessarily be considered in a real rule of reason case.243

241. See supranotes 12-123 and accompanying text.
242. See supranotes 9, 222 and accompanying text. The perse doctrine has persisted in cases of
horizontal price-fixing as well as vertical price-fixing, horizontal territorial and customer allocation,
and certain tie-ins and boycotts. For cases explaining the rationale for a per se rule, see, e.g.,
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984); Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist.No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
Even in its seminal rule of reason decisions, the Court has recognized that some restraints were so
unreasonable as to require facial invalidation. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58,
63-68 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-81 (1911).
243. See Hyde, 466 U.S. at 34 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that prevailing tying analysis
incurs costs but not benefits of rule of reason approach). In NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26, the Court
cited Hyde and acknowledged that tying doctrine underscored the fact that it is difficult to draw a
precise line of demarcation between per se and rule of reason analysis. In fact, the Court in NCAA
recognized that "the rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye." Id. at 109
n.39 (quoting Phillip Areeda, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 38
(1981)). Accordingly, the Court has sometimes found rule of reason violations even without
elaborate market definition when anticompetitive effects are obvious. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (detailed market analysis not essential in boycott case where
anticompetitive effect clear); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110 (naked restraint on price and output requires
proof ofjustification even in absence of detailed market analysis). For recent commentary regarding
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Further, lower federal courts prior to Kodak had been willing to
consider
affirmative
defenses
to
otherwise
illegal
tying
arrangements2 -- a result inconsistent with traditional per se analysis and
its avoidance of detailed factual investigation. That is, given the
rationale for per se principles, the fact that a court might actually find a
restraint procompetitive or not significantly anticompetitive in a
particular case would usually not preclude per se treatment.
Consideration of business justifications that might reveal procompetitive
consequences for tie-ins therefore seemed inconsistent with this
approach.
Although this fundamental question of per se versus rule of reason
treatment for tying arrangements was ripe for reconsideration, the
majority in Kodak made no reference to these separate methods of
antitrust analysis.245 Justice Scalia, in dissent, was persuasive in
explaining that plaintiffs in Kodak had waived any rule of reason claim
and were pursuing only a per se theory of liability. :46 Nevertheless, the
majority was rather cryptic in its discussion of the ISOs' claims, leaving
readers of the opinion uncertain about its implications for future tying
analysis. Justice Blackmun merely noted that tie-ins violate section 1
when the seller has appreciable market power in the tying product and
the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied
product.247 The majority made no attempt to distinguish between per se

the rule of reason and perse approaches to antitrust analysis, see Thomts A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling
the Per Se andRule ofReason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685 (1991).
244. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir.
1987) (quality control, goodwill, and no less restrictive alternative available), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
870 (1988); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 n.9 (9th Cir. 1971) (protection of trade
secret suggested in dicta), cert. denied,405 U.S. 955 (1972); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505,
514-16 (2d Cir. 1964) (possible protection of trademark), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965);
Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 469 (1st Cir. 1962) (protection of trademark); Dehydrating
Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656-57 (Ist Cr.) (avoidance of consumer
dissatisfaction), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (protection of business reputation in an infant industry, but noting
that justification is not applicable after passage of time), aff'dper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
245. The Court has observed in the past that "there is often no bright line separating per se from
Rule of Reason analysis." NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26.
246. This suggests that despite the majority's silence on the question, Kodak should be viewed as
aper se case and the majority's opinion should be examined in that light. Of course, if this is true,
one must wonder what different analysis Justice Scalia would apply if a rule of reason claim had
been asserted and pursued. Interestingly, on remand the trial judge concluded that a rule of reason
claim could be pursued. See Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastnuin Kodak Co., No. C 87-1686
BAC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11368, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1993).
247. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072,2079 (1992).
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and rule of reason theories. The majority did add that it was not
necessary at the summary judgment stage to decide if Kodak's actions
were at all procompetitive and if any such positive effects on competition
outweighed anticompetitive effects. 48 This point implied that a rule of
reason rather than aperse method of analysis would be more appropriate
at trial, but the Court was not clear in this regard.
In sum, the Court missed a golden opportunity to clarify the
appropriate methods of tying analysis and to articulate the elements of
each approach. Justice Blackmun should have clearly stated whether he
was proceeding on the same premise as the dissent and considering only
the per se theory. Further, and perhaps more importantly, if the Court
intended to retain the hybrid or quasi-perse approach, it lost its chance to
articulate how a rule of reason tying claim, properly alleged and
preserved, would proceed differently from the per se claim.
Antitrust practitioners and scholars are still left wondering how rule of
reason analysis will really differ from the hybrid per se approach and
whether they can usefully be distinguished.249 More specifically, could a
248. Id. at 2088.
249. The case law prior to Kodak indicates that while some federal courts purported to distinguish
between per se and rule of reason tying cases, other courts seemed to muddle together tying doctrine
under one approach. Compare Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959
F.2d 468, 481 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992); Baxley-DeLamar Monuments,
Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 938 F.2d 846, 850 (8th Cir. 1991); Datagate, Inc. v. HewlettPackard Co., 941 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1667 (1992); Beard v.
Parkview Hosp., 912 F.2d 138, 140 (6th Cir. 1990); Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc.
v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 891 F.2d 1473, 1483 n.l 1 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Mount Washington Cemetery v. Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc., 495 U.S. 930
(1990); Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290, 1295-98 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1073 (1990); Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712, 720-21 (7th
Cir. 1987); Action Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Atlanticare Health Servs., Inc., 815 F. Supp. 33, 36 (D.
Mass. 1993); Greene County Memorial Park v. Behm Funeral Homes, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1276, 1285
(W.D. Pa. 1992), affd mem., 993 F.2d 876 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 187 (1993); Webb v.
Primo's Inc., 706 F. Supp, 863, 867 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Gould v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 1990-1 Trade
Cas. 68,993, at 63,448 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v Hibbett, 689 F. Supp. 799,
809 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd inparton other grounds, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Cemar, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1091,
1099-1100 (D. Del. 1988); Drs. Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. National Medical Enters., 672 F. Supp.
1489, 1503-04 (D.S.C. 1987), aft'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988); W.H. Brady Co. v. Lem Prods.,
Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1355, 1373-73 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (drawing distinctions betweenper se and rule of
reason standards for antitrust tying analysis) with Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d
780, 788 (2d Cir. 1992); Shafi v. St. Francis Hosp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. 69,500, at 66,134 (4th Cir.
1991); Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1411-12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 617
(1991); Xeta, Inc. v. Atex, Inc., 852 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni
Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1414 (1lth Cir. 1987); Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. Oxy
USA, Inc., 1991-2 Trade Cas. 69,510, at 66,241 (W.D. Okla. 1991); 305 East 24th Owners Corp. v.
Parman Co., 714 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 994 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993); O'Riordan
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plaintiff succeed even if the defendant lacked market power in the tying
product?2 5 Would coercion remain an element of the offense and, if so,

v. Long Island Board of Realtors, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 111, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Blair v. All
American Bottling Corp., 1988-2 Trade Cas. 68,372, at 60,068 (S.D. Cal. 1988); Aspen Title &
Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477, 1488 (D. Or. 1987); Andrea Theatres, Inc. v.
Theatre Confections, Inc., 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,711, at 58,694 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Kellam
Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668 F. Supp. 861, 880 (D. Del. 1987); BJ.L.M. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Block
Distrib. Co., 1987-2 Trade Cas. 67,710, at 58,691 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Taggart v. Rutledge, 657 F.
Supp. 1420, 1446 (D. Mont. 1987), aff'd mem., 852 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1988); Posa, Inc. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 642 F. Supp. 1198, 1209 ( E.D.N.Y. 1986) (failing to clearly articulate differences
between rule of reason and per se analysis). Since the Kodak decision, at least one lower court has
suggested a separate test for perse and rule of reason analysis in the lying context. See Lee v. The
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 829 F. Supp. 529,536-37 n.4 (D.R.I. 1993).
250. In Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 481-85 (3d
Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992), the Third Circuit expressly rejected the notion
that rule of reason analysis also required market power to prove a tie-in unreasonable. The court
reasoned that a contrary conclusion would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's articulation of
the law in Hyde. Id. at 483. The court in Town Sound did conclude, however, that the plaintiffs'
theories of causation were flawed, and it therefore affirmed summary judgment for defendant. Id. at
487-95. This prompted Chief Judge Sloviter and one colleague to file a concurring and dissenting
opinion agreeing that market power was unnecessary for a rule of reason violation but disagreeing
with the majority's treatment of the causation question. Id. at 497-503 (Sloviter, CJ., concurring
and dissenting). The Chief Judge argued that the majority was using the lack of market power to
support its finding of an absence of antitrust injury. Id at 502; see also Greene County Memorial
Park v. Behm Funeral Homes, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (stating that defendant
need not have market power over tying product in rule of reason claim), aff d mem., 993 F.2d 876
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 187 (1993); Microbyte Corp. v. New Jersey State Golf Ass'n,
1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,228, at 61,164 (D.N.J. 1986) (suggesting that rule of reason violation
could be proved without market power). But see Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies,
Inc., 1993-2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70,378, at 70,985-86 (N.D. Ili. 1993) (rejecting argument that
Kodak dismisses market power requirement to support tying claim and stating that market power is
demanded under bothper se and rule of reason tests).
Professor Hovenkamp has asserted that, despite language in cases and commentary to the
contrary,"[i]n no recent case... has a court condemned a tie-in when there was an express finding
that the defendant had no market power in the tying product." Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and
Federal Antitrust Law § 8.3, at 218 (1985). Others have suggested that even in the absence of
market power, tie-ins may be anticompetitive. See, e.g., Richard Crnswell, Tying Requirements in
Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 661, 663, 671-81, 700
(1982) (recognizing that consumers may be injured by tie-ins even if the defendant lacks market
power, but suggesting that the issue is more of a consumer protection question than an antitrust
concer); W. David Slawson, Excluding Competition Without Monopoly Power: The Use of Tying
Arrangements To Exploit Market Failure,36 Antitrust Bull. 457,493 '1991) (commenting that some
competitive harms resulting from tie-ins do not require monopoly power); see also Areeda, supra
note 3, 1704c2, at 60-61 (suggesting that monopoly in tied market could result without monopoly
in tying market). Professor Areeda also notes, however, that "[w]ith zero power in the market for the
tying product, a tie-in cannot be a vehicle for distorting competition in the second market." Id.
1728d, at 371. The ultimate focus, according to Professor Areeda, is the degree of foreclosure in the
tied product market. Id. at 372. Professor Ross concludes that a rle of reason inquiry for tying
arrangements is "virtually identical to" the analysis used for exclusive dealing arrangements, thus
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how could it be established in the absence of market power?251 Could
any anticompetitive effects result in the absence of any real market
power? If affirmative defenses to a per se claim are still permissible,
what role do they play in the rule of reason claim? Is evidence of
procompetitive effects flowing from the tie limited to the types of
evidence presented as affirmative defenses in other antitrust cases, or will
courts consider additional matters? While a number of courts have
specifically noted that in the absence ofper se illegality, a plaintiff could
still prevail pursuant to rule of reason analysis by demonstrating
anticompetitive effects, these decisions provide little or no explanation to
illustrate when or how such effects would manifest themselves absent
market powerY2 Although primary emphasis in discussions regarding
tying arrangements is usually placed on the alleged danger of a tying
market monopoly being "leveraged" into the tied market, other potential
Further, the
anticompetitive effects merit judicial consideration."

focusing significantly on the degree of foreclosure of competition. Stephen F. Ross, Principlesof
Antitrust Law 300 (1993).
251. If Professor Areeda is correct in his assessment that foreclosure of competition is the key
question in these cases, see supra note 250 and infra note 252, it arguably matters not whether the
defendant forced or coerced the plaintiff or whether the plaintiff willingly acceded to the alleged tiein. In either scenario, the crucial inquiry would be whether the arrangement foreclosed such a
significant share of the tied market that it could not support a competitive number of efficient rivals.
252. See supra notes 250-51 for cases and commentary regarding the issue of market power in
tying analysis. Professor Areeda has explained that, in his view, the central question in all tying
cases is the degree of foreclosure in the tied product market. Thus, he writes:
I believe that the single best way to judge potentially adverse effects is by the severity of the
foreclosure in a market, whether or not that foreclosure was brought about by power over a
different product... Without unreasonable foreclosure, the arrangement would be lawfl even
if it involved a tie-in; with unreasonable foreclosure, the arrangement would be prima facie
unlawful even if not a tie.
Areeda, supranote 3,

1701d, at 29.

Professor Areeda also notes:
That a defendant obtains patronage in a second market through a tie does not itself explain how
or why the tie impairs the vitality of competition there. Small foreclosures can seldom, if ever,
do so. To impair the vitality of competition in the tied market, the tie must preempt so much
patronage that not enough remains to support a competitive number of efficient rivals.
Id. 1704a, at 55-56 (footnotes omitted).
These assertions are consistent with the notion that even in the absence of the type of market
power required forperse invalidity of tie-ins, or in the absence of the element of coercion referred to
in the Supreme Court cases, a tie could still violate section 1 in a rule of reason case if the requisite
foreclosure were established in the tied product market.
253. See Ross, supranote 250, at 277-84, citing extension of monopoly, exclusion of rivals, price
discrimination, impingement on consumer choice, reduction of consumer awareness, and the
facilitation of cartel pricing as economic harms attributable to tie-ins. Professor Areeda adds the
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Supreme Court has yet to discuss satisfactorily the procompetitive effects
of some tie-ins and the role of such effects in an appropriate analysis. 4
Indeed, the presence of identifiable procompetitive virtues strikes at the
very heart of the classic rationale for using per se analysis. Unless a
restraint almost always lacks any redeeming value, courts should eschew
reliance on the per se concept and substitute a rule of reason approach.
A related problem not reached in Kodak is the role that section 3 of
the Clayton Act should play in tying jurisprudence. While some
commentators have concluded that section 3 analysis and Sherman Act
section 1 analysis are now identical, that conclusion is certainly not selfevident from the legislative history, statutory language, or earlier case
law pursuant to section 3 .s Kodak properly avoided any discussion of
section 3 because that provision deals solely with commodities and does
not extend to trade restraints involving services, 26 but the issue of
section 3's scope remains unresolved.2 57 A Supreme Court decision

creation of a new monopoly or oligopoly in the tied product market, reduction of price competition
among pre-existing oligopolists, raised entry barriers, limitation of input substitution, evasion of
government price controls, evasion of price floors, concealment of true prices, cheating of upstream
suppliers, obstruction of copying, blocking of customer autonomy, and foreclosure of a customer's
access to supplies as possible reasons for attacking tie-ins. Areeda, sul.ra note 3, 1703, at 32-50.
Professor Areeda is skeptical, however, about the propriety of treating: some of these problems as
antitrust concerns, and would focus on the degree of foreclosure in th tied product market as the
principal focal point of antitrust doctrine. Id.
In Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 475-76 (3d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992), the Third Circuit summarized the potential evils of tieins by referring to leveraging, raising of entry barriers in the tied product market, impeding
innovation in the tied product market, and price discrimination or evasion of price or other
regulatory controls. The possibility of increased entry barriers resulting from tie-ins was also noted
in Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir. 1988)
(commenting that a tie-in might require new competitor to enter both markets to compete).
254. See Areeda, supranote 3, 1703g, at 50, suggesting that "[t]ying sometimes benefits society
by protecting quality, lowering costs or increasing value, increasing price competition, aiding entry,
or rewarding a valuable patent"
255. See id. 1719b, at 254-57, arguing that, despite differences in statutory language, the
Sherman and Clayton Act standards "apply a single substantive standard." Id. at 254. Compare
Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 495-96, where the court of appeals acknowledged that some have found
that the Sherman and Clayton Act standards have "coalesced," id. at 496 n.42, but also recognized
that the Clayton Act language "does suggest that the Clayton Act generelly has a weaker standard for
liability," id. at 496. The Town Sound court also noted that the legislative history of the Clayton Act,
while "complicated," did not provide a clear answer. Id. at 496 nA3. For recent support for a
different Clayton Act standard, see also infra notes 281,283 and accomaanying text.
256. For the relevant statutory language in section 3, see supranote 6.
257. It is undeniable that section 3, on its face, purports to make the substantive test of liability
whether the effect of a restraint "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly." The choice of the words "may" and "tend" connote something less than a full-blown
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focusing on section 3 could provide much needed clarity in a still
somewhat murky area of antitrust jurisprudence.
B.

Market Definition Problems

The issue of market definition is one that plays a prominent role not
only in tying jurisprudence but also in almost every area of antitrust law.
Cases involving monopolization, mergers, vertical non-price restraints,
boycotts, and other matters may all hinge upon the finding that market
power follows from certain definitions of the relevant market. Kodak
presented the Court with an opportunity to address the market definition
question and provide appropriate guidance.
For many years, the Court has endorsed the notion that all products
reasonably interchangeable with each other be included in the relevant
5 9 the reasonable
Specifically reaffirmed in Kodak,"
product market."
interchangeability test seeks to determine whether cross-elasticity of
demand exists between products. If a relatively slight increase in the
price of product A results in a significant shift in patronage to product B,
it makes sense to include both in the relevant market. Sellers of A would
not be able to profit from charging a supercompetitive price because
consumers could readily switch to an adequate substitute at a lower cost.
This interbrand competition thus provides a powerful check on the
ability to enhance price through output restriction or other market
behavior.

adverse effect on competitive forces. Rather, the language suggests a lower threshold for liability,
predicated upon probable future developments resulting from the restraint. Not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court labeled section 3 an "incipiency" statute early in its history: "The Clayton Act sought
to reach the agreements embraced within its sphere in their incipiency, and in the section under
Standard Fashion Co. v.
consideration to determine their legality by specific tests of its own ....
Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922) (considering exclusive dealing claim). See also
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 459 (1922) (stating that Sherman and
Clayton Acts have "different tests of liability"). Accordingly, section 3 addresses restraints which
threaten a "reasonable probability" of evolving into a significant threat to competition. As Congress
has not altered the operative language of section 3, it is not unreasonable to ask why courts and
commentators rather cavalierly conclude that the Sherman and Clayton Act standards are now
identical. Even if sound policy arguments may be articulated to support this result, is it for the
judicial branch to ignore what appears to be a rather plain attempt to legislatively mandate a lower,
less permissive threshold for antitrust liability?
258. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571-73 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 328, 336-39 (1962); United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395
(1956); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953).
259. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072,2090 (1992).
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In Kodak, the question of market definition arose regarding Kodak
brand replacement parts, and defendant argued that he single brand of a
particular manufacturer should not be deemed to constitute a relevant
market for antitrust purposes. The Court, however, suggested that
market conditions could support a conclusion that a single brand did
represent a relevant market. Although it would be unfair to criticize the
Court too extensively given Kodak's procedural posture, it is unclear
from the majority opinion just how broadly we can apply the result.
First, after trial it might turn out that Kodak accurately contends that
interbrand competition in the equipment market does affect the
aftermarket in a way that supports broader market definition. Second,
although the majority does make clear that a single brand of product may
comprise a relevant market, the meaning of the Court's reference to the
"'commercial realities' faced by consumers ' is not evident. While the
Court correctly observed that it and some lower federal courts have
occasionally endorsed narrow market definitions,26' it is also undeniable
that some lower courts have rejected single brand market definitions and
the Supreme Court itself has frequently opted for broader definitions as
well.2 62
The Court's reliance in Kodak on information and switching costs and
its focus upon the fact that Kodak parts arid service are not
interchangeable with non-Kodak aftermarkets may support a narrow
market definition on the facts of this case. What guidance this provides
in other cases is more problematic. Is the Court endorsing single brand
market definition whenever a significant number of consumers have
expressed a preference for a particular brand? Does this connote that
trademarked and other differentiated goods may constitute distinct
markets? Or, should courts construe Kodak more narrowly to endorse
narrow market definitions in very limited circumstances where a
combination of locked-in customers and restrictive practices preclude
arbitrage as a means of creating competition for the needed parts and
service? In addition, what roles do potential competition and/or potential
for arbitrage play in defining relevant markets?

260. Id.
261. Id. at 2090 n.31.
262. The best example of the Supreme Court's adoption of a broad market definition is DuPont,
351 U.S. at 400, where the Court defimed the market as all flexible packaging materials, rather than
just cellophane. See also Kodak, 112 S.Ct. at 2099-3000 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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C.

Market PowerIssues

Closely related to the market definition problem is the assessment of
market power. Assuming a properly defined market, how should a court
determine whether a particular defendant has market power-the power
to raise price to a supercompetitive level?263 Traditionally, the Court has
focused primarily, if not exclusively, on "market share." For example, in
Kodak, once the Court concluded that the relevant market could
theoretically be Kodak parts and service, it focused upon Kodak's nearly
market and eighty to ninety-five-percent
100-percent share of the parts
24
share of the service market. 6
263. The Supreme Court has defined "market power" as "the ability to raise prices above those
that would be charged in a competitive market." National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2, 27 nA6 (1984); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977);
DuPont, 351 U.S. at 391). In Kodak, the Court reaffirmed this view, citing Hyde, Fortner,and
DuPont for the proposition that market power is the power to force a purchaser to do something it
would not do in a competitive market. 112 S. Ct. at 2080. The Court went on in Kodak to state that
market power is "the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output," and that market
power is usually inferred from a predominant market share. Id. at 2080-81 (quoting Fortner Enters.,
Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)).
Scholars have defined the concept similarly, often adding the requirement that supercompetitive
prices be maintained for a significant period of time without unacceptable diminution in sales. See
George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 Antitrust L.J. 807, 812-13 (1992) (collecting
definitions from Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, Landes, Posner, Areeda, and Turner).
264. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2090. The Court noted that these percentages were sufficiently high to
satisfy the section 2 requirement of monopoly power for summary judgment purposes, and that
monopoly power requires "something greater" than market power for section 1 purposes. Id. The
Court did not specify what it meant by "something greater." In Hyde, 466 U.S. at 26-29, the Court
had rejected a 30-percent market share as insufficient to establish the requisite power in the tying
product market.
In the tying context, federal courts have often relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Hyde and
focused on the presence or absence of high market shares to determine whether sufficient economic
power exists with regard to the tying product. Compare D.O. McComb & Sons, Inc. v. Memory
Gardens Management Corp., 736 F. Supp. 952, 956-57 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (60 percent of burial
market in one county suggests power, citing Hyde); McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., 597 F. Supp.
899, 913 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (55-60 percent of market for diagnostic nuclear medicine procedures and
100 percent of market for therapeutic procedures raises genuine fact issue; citing Hyde) with Shafi v.
St. Francis Hosp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,500, at 66,134 (4th Cir. 1991) (11-percent market
share in hospital market insufficient; citing Hyde); Baxley-DeLamar Monuments, Inc. v. American
Cemetery Ass'n, 938 F.2d 846, 852 (8th Cir. 1991) (29-31-percent share of cemetery market not
enough; citing Hyde); Western Power Sports, Inc. v. Polaris Ind. Partners L.P., 744 F. Supp. 226,
229 (D. Idaho 1990) (31 percent of retail snowmobile market insufficient; citing Hyde), rev'd mem.,
951 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 70 (1993); M. Leff Radio Parts, Inc. v. Mattel,
Inc., 706 F. Supp. 387, 399 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (30 percent of home video game market too low; citing
Hyde); Seaward Yacht Sales, Ltd. v. Murray Chris-Craft Cruisers, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D.
Or. 1988) (less than 5 percent of cruiser sales inadequate); Homeware, Inc. v. Rexair, Inc., 1988-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,085, at 58,593 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (3 percent of relevant market for vacuum
cleaners insufficient).
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What other evidence, besides market share, should courts use to
Should
determine the presence or absence of market power?
"uniqueness" act as a relevant concern even if adequate functional
substitutes appear to exist?26 Again, should patents, trademarks, and
consumer preferences count?26 Do cost advantages matter?267 Recent
265. Earlier Supreme Court opinions referred to the alleged uniqueness of a tying product as a
basis for concluding that market power exists in the tying product market. FortnerHI,however, cut
back on an expansive use of uniqueness as a short cut to finding the requisite power. See supra
notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
Recent lower federal antitrust decisions have reached differing result; when uniqueness allegations
have been made to support tie-in claims. Compare Outlet Communications, Inc. v. King World
Productions, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1570, 1577 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (finding Wheel of Fortune may be
sufficiently unique) with Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 689 F. Supp. 799, 810 (M.D. Tenn.
1988) (accepting argument that lack of legal, physical, or economic bzxriers to competitors offering
similar service makes family centered maternity care insufficiently unique).
266. The treatment of patents, copyrights, and trademarks as sufficient evidence of tying market
power has been critically discussed in recent cases. See, e.g., Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 480 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (trademark itself not equivalent of
economic power), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992); Mozart Co. v. Mrrcedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc.,
833 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987) (trademark not persuasive eviderce of economic power), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Webb v. Primo's Inc., 706 F. Supp. 861, 868 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (mere
existence of a unique fianchise trade or service mark may not suffice); Allen-Myland, Inc. v.
International Business Mach. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 262, 281 (E. D. Pa 1988) (uniqueness or patent
not necessarily sufficient to establish market power); Tominaga v. Shepherd, 682 F. Supp. 1489,
1493-94 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (pizza franchise trademark not sufficiently unique); Klo-Zik Co. v.
General Motors Corp., 677 F. Supp. 499, 505 (E.D. Tex. 1987) (patent does not always create market
power, citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Hyde); Nobel Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Beekman
Instruments, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1313, 1328 (D. Md. 1986) (patent does not necessarily reflect market
power), afd, 831 F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1226 (1988). Even parcels of
land, traditionally thought of as non-fimgible and distinct, have been deemed insufficiently unique to
confer market power in tying cases. See Baxley-DeLamar Monuments, Inc. v. American Cemetery
Ass'n, 938 F.2d 846, 852 (8th Cir. 1991); 305 East 24th Owners Corp. v. Parman Co., 714 F. Supp.
1296, 1306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Because Kodak concluded that a single brand product market definition might be appropriate in
some cases, 112 S. Ct. at 2090, it will be interesting and important to see whether the decision will
have significant impact on the course of lower federal court decisions regarding patents, copyrights,
or trademarks. Courts could follow Kodak but still conclude that the "commercial realities" faced by
consumers dictate a broader product market definition even if patent, copyright, or trademark
protects the tying product. Conversely, the willingness of the Kodak majority to endorse narrow
market definitions could resurrect treatment of trademarked or patented goods as sufficiently unique.
For examples of this earlier, alternative approach, see Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d
1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984) (unique, copyrighted tying product), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985);
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971) (distinctive trademark reflecting
consumer goodwill and acceptance unique), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). For rejection of
single brand markets in tie-in cases, see Town Sound, 959 F.2d ft 480 (Chrysler-only market
inappropriate); Homeware, Inc. v. Rexair, Inc., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,085, at 58,593 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (claim that one brand of vacuum cleaners constituted market was "patently frivolous").
For a recent discussion of tie-ins in the franchise context, see Jill M. Aubin, Franchise Tie-Ins: The
State oftheLaw, 26 New Eng. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (citing numerous cases and secondary authorities).
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literature has suggested other methods of measuring market power, such
as the raising of rivals' costs. 6 8 What about the role of entry barriers and
the argument that in their absence no real power exists to control price or
exclude competition? If entry barriers are relevant, do low or nonexistent barriers suggest that actual market share is a particularly poor
measure of real economic power? In a related vein, should potential
competition be included in any calculation of market share and market
power? Should the courts consider trends in demand and questions
regarding excess capacity? Should trends in sellers' market shares be
considered? Does dynamic innovation affect the analysis? What about
countervailing buyer power? Are profitability levels relevant?2 69 Kodak
does not consider these alternative approaches to market power
determination and arguably forfeits an opportunity to at least consider
and choose from the best of the more recent approaches.
In sum,
reliance on market share may result in failures to assess the presence of
market power where a relatively small share does not accurately reflect
"economic realities," and an inference of power derived merely from a
relatively high share may be misleading and inaccurate. Kodak's tunnelvision focus on market share leaves uncertain the fate of these other
methods of assessing market power.
In addition, the Court in Kodak focused upon the idiosyncratic
position of "locked-in" customers. Will the uniqueness of these
customers as compared to other business traders necessitate a narrow
reading of Kodak regarding market power? Further, the role of market
imperfections and their implications for other cases remains unclear.

267. The Supreme Court, in Fortner1, 429 U.S. at 617, specifically referred to a defendant's cost
advantages as a possible source of the requisite economic power in the tying product. More recently,
cost advantages have been cited as a potential basis for finding market power in the tying product.
See Klo-Zik, 677 F. Supp. at 505 (cost advantages might suffice if evidence supported such a
finding); Patterson Dental Co. v, McGaughey, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,931, at 61,795 (D. Or.
1985) (power can be established if competitors unable to offer equivalent product or service
profitably).
268. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law,
76 Geo. L.J. 241 (1987); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
RaisingRivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price,96 Yale L. J. 209 (1986).
269. Many of these questions were raised in Daniel M. Wall, Beyond Market Share-Strategies
for the High Market Share Firm, Antitrust, FallAWinter 1991, at 24. For other recent commentary
regarding approaches to market power questions, see Jerry A. Hausman et al., A ProposedMethod
for Analyzing Competition Among Differentiated Products, 60 Antitrust L.J. 889 (1992); David
Scheffinan, StatisticalMeasures of Market Power: Uses and Abuses, 60 Antitrust L.J. 901 (1992).
See also Handler et al., supra note 49, at 215-223; Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant
Market and the Assault on Antitrust,90 Colum. L. Rev. 1805 (1990).
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What will constitute a sufficient market imperfection to affect market
definition and market power analysis?
D.

The One or Two ProductIssue

One issue that the Court did address clearly was the question of
whether parts and service can constitute separate relevant markets. In
concluding that they could be considered separate markets, the majority
in Kodak reiterated the narrow five-justice majority's character of
demand approach in Hyde-whether sufficient consumer demand exists
so that it is efficient for a firm to provide service separately from parts.27
Rejecting the notion that functionally linked products cannot be deemed
separate, the Court more firmly endorsed the Hyde approach with a sixjustice majority.
The implications of this approach, however, were not fully evaluated.
The use of the character of demand approach raises questions in many
commercial contexts and is not always easy to apply.271 For example, if

270. Kodak; 112 S. Ct. at 2080.
271. Applications of the character of demand test prior to and after Kodak have produced varying
results in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors v. Realty Photo
Master Corp., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,239, at 70,181 (4th Cir.) (listing service and
photographs one product), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 440 (1993); Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen.
Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 684 (4th Cir. 1992) (computer repair software licenses and repair services
separate products); Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566, 1574-76 (11th Cir.
1991) (multilist service and professional association membership separate markets); Illinois Bell Tel.
Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1990) (desired listings and unwanted listings one
product), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1408 (1991); Wells Real Estate, Inc. v Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors,
Inc., 850 F.2d 803, 815 (1st Cir.) (multiple listing service and board membership may not be separate
products), cert. denied,488 U.S. 955 (1988); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473,
477-78 (7th Cir.) (hospital services and pathology services are one product), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
852 (1988); Southern Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d 1360, 1363 (4th
Cir. 1987) (desired automobiles and undesired automobiles not separte products); Parts & Elec.
Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 1987) (motors and replacement parts
are separate products); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185, 193-94
(D. Mass. 1991) (genuine dispute as to whether copyrighted diagnostic program and repair services
one or two products); D.O. McComb & Sons, Inc. v. Memory Gardens Management Corp., 736 F.
Supp. 952, 957 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (burial plots and opening and closing services separate products);
Digital Equip. Corp. v. System Indus., Inc., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,901, at 62,837 (D. Mass.
1990) (technological interrelationship of patented interconnect products and peripheral storage
devices not determinative on one or two product question); Hodge v. Villages of Homestead
Homeowners Ass'n, 726 F. Supp. 297, 298-99 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (further discovery needed to
determine whether condominium units and contract for maintenance services separate products);
Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 262, 289-90 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(computer upgrade parts and labor not separate products); Krause v. General Motors Corp., 1988-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,163, at 59,094 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (automobiles and low interest financing
one product); Klo-Zik Co. v. General Motors Corp., 677 F. Supp. 499, 503-04 (E.D. Tex. 1987)
(warranties and engines not separate products; summary judgment for defendant); Smith v. Mobil
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there is sufficient consumer demand to obtain rights to use a trademark
or a franchise identification, will the franchiser or trademark holder be
stifled in attempts to protect goodwill by conditioning a license upon the
willingness of the licensee to purchase a package of materials or service?
Or, alternatively, should the courts resolve this problem at another point
in the antitrust analysis when the issue ofjustifications is raised?
E.

A Narrow,ProceduralDecision orProfound, Substantive
Implications?

Arguably the most critical uncertainty engendered by Kodak is
whether the case is properly viewed as merely a procedural decision
regarding the propriety of summary judgment rather than as a farreaching, substantive ruling that changes the face of antitrust
jurisprudence. A narrow, defendant-oriented view of the decision might
be that the denial of an adequate opportunity for the ISOs to conduct
discovery precluded summary adjudication of claims that made some
"economic sense." After all, the Court itself did not regard its decision
as inconsistent with its earlier pronouncements in Matsushita regarding
summary judgment in antitrust cases. Instead, the majority in Kodak
carefully distinguished Matsushita as a case that involved an antitrust
theory making no economic sense following quite extensive discovery.
At the very least, Kodak may dramatically alter the current trend
towards increased use of summary proceedings in antitrust cases. In the
wake of Matsushita, courts previously reluctant to utilize summary
judgment to shorten protracted antitrust litigation became more
aggressive in ridding themselves of questionable claims without the time
and expense of full-blown trials. Whether Kodak will signal a return to
the pre-Matsushita era, during which reluctance to dismiss antitrust
plaintiffs prevailed, remains to be seen. This result would have profound
consequences for litigants and judges alike, but would not necessarily
affect prevailing substantive doctrine.
On the other hand, a more expansive reading of Kodak suggests
significant substantive implications with respect to fundamental
questions such as market definition and market power. Only future
decisions by federal courts will satisfactorily reveal the true extent of
Kodak's effects on antitrust principles. Certainly, one cannot fault the
majority in Kodak for failure to be clearer on this point. The Court was,

Oil Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1314, 1324 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (branded gasoline and trademark not separate
products).
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after all, confronted with an appeal from a reversal of a grant of summary
judgment. Still, the substantive implications of the decision could
significantly affect tying practices by many manufacturers and
distributors of durable goods requiring service and replacement parts.
More sweeping ramifications may also be felt in tying doctrine generally
and in other areas because of the market definition implications of the
decision. 2

272. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Kodak, the case has been cited in the lower federal
courts and just recently by the Supreme Court itself in Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). The precise implications and effects of Kodak remain
unclear. In Brown & Williamson, the Court focused upon language in Kodak requiring courts to
examine "realities of the market" rather than rely merely upon econom.c theory. Id. at 2591. Thus,
"theory will not stand in the way of liability." Id.
The Court's analysis seems consistent with a retreat from rigid, Chicago School antitrust analysis;
however, the actual result in Brown & Williamson parallels that of the rigorous economic approach
of the Chicago School. In Brown & Williamson, the majority concluded that, in a primary line
Robinson-Patman price discrimination case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant had priced
its goods below an appropriate level of costs and had a reasonable prospect of recouping its
investment in below-cost prices. Id. at 2587-89. This approach to predation is wholly consistent
with the Chicago School and reflects a judicial philosophy contrary to the populist, less economicsoriented methods of earlier case law. Thus, while the majority in Erown & Williamson pledges
fealty to Kodak's reliance upon market realities rather than pure economic theory, the result reached
fits comfortably within the Bork, Posner, and Easterbrook approaches to antitrust doctrine.
The lower federal court decisions citing Kodak also fail to provide an entirely clear picture
regarding its effects on the course of antitrust decision making. See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v.
Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993) (Kodak's "quasi" per se rule for tying
cited); Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 1993-2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70,322, at
70,671 (3d. Cir. 1993) (Kodak cited for summary judgment standard); Fineman v. Armstrong World
Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 187 (3d Cir. 1992) (Kodak's implications regarding standard of proof unclear
in non-antitrust case), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993); BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974
F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992) (Kodak supports summary judgment if theory is "economically
senseless"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1262 (1993); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Lewis, Overbeck & Furman,
979 F.2d 546, 549 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992) (Supreme Court has not resolved question of need for power in
tied product market); Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1490 (8th Cir. 1992) (Kodak
does not mandate special antitrust summary judgment standard), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048
(1993); Digital Equip. Co. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 1993..2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1
70,378, at 70,985-85 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Kodak sets standards for tying violation and requires market
power regardless of whether usingper se or rule of reason test); Lee v. The Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
829 F. Supp. 529, 536, 536-37 n.4 (D.R.I. 1993) (definition of tying and distinction between per se
and rule of reason tests); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., No. CV-S-89-249 PMP (LRL), 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10406, at *40 (D. Nev. July 21, 1993) (rejection of use of Kodak to support narrow market
definition); Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n, 1993-2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70,289, at
70,480-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Kodak's section 2 requirements and tests for market power); Farr v.
Healtheast, Inc., 1993-2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 70,294, at 70,515-17 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Kodak
provides definition of market power and elements of section 2 violation); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa
U.S.A. Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 971-72 (D. Utah 1993) (Kodak requires economically sensible
theory); Lifeline Ltd. No. II v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 821 F. Supp. 1201, 1207 (E.D. Mich.
1993) (Kodak requires definition of product and geographic markets); Bums v. Cover Studios, Inc.,
818 F. Supp. 888, 892 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (Kodak's cross-elasticity of demand test for market
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Further, the Kodak decision may reflect a movement away from the
approach of Posner, Bork, Easterbrook, and others to antitrust, usually
'
labeled the "Chicago School."273
The Court had already demonstrated
reluctance to embrace the Chicago School approach in its entirety, and
Kodak may ultimately encourage courts to focus somewhat less on
economic theory and assumptions and more on actual procompetitive
and anticompetitive effects. Certainly, Kodak is a case where the
majority seemed less enamored of economic theory and more concerned

definition cited); New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848, 873 n.70 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(Kodak suggests that standard for market power in section 1 case is lower than in section 2 case);
King v FDIC, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1992, at *20 n.7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 1992) (nonmovant gets
benefit of inferences on summary judgment motion); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 801 F.
Supp. 517, 521-22 (D. Utah 1992) (Kodakmight disfavor summary disposition of antitrust claims);
D.O. McComb & Sons v. Memory Gardens Management, 813 F. Supp. 663, 669-70 (N.D. Ind.
1992) (Kodak dicta not intended to narrow federal antitrust jurisdiction); Microsoft Corp. v. BEC
Computer Co., 818 F. Supp. 1313, 1317 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (Kodak's definition of a tie-in cited);
Comm-Tract Corp. v. Northern Telecom, Inc. 143 F.R.D. 20, 22-23 (D. Mass. 1992) (Kodak
analyzes elements of antitrust claims but does not discuss use of survey evidence); Go-Video, Inc. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,972, at 68,721 (D. Ariz. 1992) (elements
of claim for attempted monopolization).
It is difficult to discern from these decisions just what impact Kodak will have on the future of
antitrust jurisprudence.
273. For commentary espousing the Chicago School approach to antitrust law, see Robert H.
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox(1978); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev.
1 (1984); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925
(1979). For a more populist approach, see Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernizationof Antitrust: A New
Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140 (1981); Robert Pitofsky, The PoliticalContent ofAntitrust,
127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051 (1979); Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of
Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1076 (1979). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After
Chicago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213 (1985), for a critical assessment of the Chicago School's influence
on the development of antitrust doctrine. According to Professor Hovenkamp:
The Chicago School model of antitrust policy dictates that allocative efficiency as defined by
the market should be the only goal of the antitrust laws. Within that paradigm even evidence
derived from the legislative history of the antitrust laws is unimportant, unless to show that the
legislative history supports or undermines the model. If the latter, the preservation of the model
requires that the legislative history of the antitrust laws be deemed irrelevant to their current
interpretation.

Orthodox Chicago School antitrust policy is predicated on two assumptions about the goals
of the federal antitrust laws: (1) the best policy tool currently available for maximizing
economic efficiency in the real world is the neoclassical price theory model; and (2) the pursuit
of economic efficiency should be the exclusive goal of the antitrust enforcement policy.
Id. at 215-16, 226 (footnotes omitted). See also Barbara Ann White, Black and White Thinking in
the Gray Areas of Antitrust: The Dismantlingof Vertical Restraints Regulation, 60 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1, 2-3 n.6 (1991) ("Chicago School is willing to forego the presence of many firms, if... less
efficient than their stronger competitors.').
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with actual facts and effects on the market. Whether this will produce a
spillover
effect that shifts antitrust analysis generally remains to be
4
seen.

V.

27

CLARIFYING THE LAW ON TYING ARRANGEMENTS: A
PRACTICAL RULE OF REASON APPROACH

In the wake of Kodak, antitrust practitioners and scholars are still
unable to articulate the definitive parameters of the Supreme Court's
tying doctrine. In antitrust decisions rendered subsequent to Kodak, the
federal courts have cited the case with respect to both substantive and
procedural aspects of antitrust litigation.275 No real pattern, however, has
emerged evidencing any convincing, unitary interpretation of Kodak or
its implications. Based on the recent cases, it is difficult to discern
whether Kodak represents a bona fide departure from Chicago School
analysis or merely a narrow, procedural decision with little potential for
significant alteration of substantive principles. 6
As an alternative to the current morass created by a quasi-per se
approach and an uncertain rule of reason, I would propose that two major
revisions be effected in current principles. The Court first should take to
heart Justice O'Connor's suggestion in Hyde regarding abandonment of
any per se concept in the tie-in area. Instead, a rule of reason approach
similar to that employed in other non-price vertical restraint cases would
be applied to tie-ins.277 Second, in the context Df the rule of reason

274. See Post-ChicagoAnalysis After Kodak. Interview with ProfesvorSteven C. Salop, Antitrust,
Fall/Winter 1992, at 20, 21, where it is asserted that the Court's analysis of the ISOs' claims in
Kodak was "post-Chicago" and that "simply shouting free rider in a crowded court does not
constitute adequate proof."
275. See supranote 272.
276. In Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 314 (1992), the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and then vacated judgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals for
further consideration in light of Kodak. In Virtual, 957 F.2d. 1318 (6th Cir. 1992), the court of
appeals had reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in a tying case. The Sixth Circuit had
premised its reversal on an alleged absence of "market power in a prcperly defined interbrand tying
product market' and an absence of "substantial anticompetitive effects in the tied product market."
Id. at 1321. Perhaps the Supreme Court's decision to remand the cas suggests that the Court itself
views Kodak as an important substantive departure from prevailin tying doctrine. Indeed, on
remand, the Sixth Circuit relied on Kodak to reverse its earlier position regarding a possible perse
tying violation in the derivative attermarket for manufacturer-required software support. Virtual
Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 3:1575, at *16 (6th Cir. Dec. 15,
1993).
277. Professor Areeda, however, has argued that tie-ins have "little in common" with other
vertical restraints. Areeda, supra note 3, 1700j4, at 18. He asserts that even though the Department
of Justice once sought to categorize tying arrangements along with other vertical restraints, "[t]he
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analysis to be applied, courts should take a realistic and pragmatic
approach to the issues of market definition and market power. Thus,
rather than merely focus upon traditional notions of market share and
actual market participants, courts should look to all factors that would
realistically affect the ability of a firm to restrict output and raise price to
a supercompetitive level. Some of these factors might demonstrate
market power where narrow, traditional approaches might not, and others
might militate against a finding of market power even when market
shares are high and sufficient under older approaches. For example,
consideration of foreclosure would permit courts, even in the absence of
traditional market power, to examine the impact of a tying arrangement
upon rivals even if the tying product market is not dominated by the
defendant.27 8 The key question would remain whether the tie-in
produced anticompetitive results in the tied product market. This shift in
analysis would have profound effects not only in the tying area, but
would also have a significant impact on all antitrust issues where market
power is relevant.279
A.

Abandoning the Per Se Concept in Tying Cases

Presently, use of the per se language in tying cases creates confusion
and does not really save the judiciary and litigants any time or expense.
On the contrary, the quasi-per se approach involves considerable factual

mechanisms by which they might impair competition are quite different, as are their possible
redeeming virtues." Id. Elaborating, Professor Areeda notes:
While it might harm other manufacturers in special circumstances, an intrabrand restraint
typically affects competition-if at all-by facilitating coordination among rival sellers or by
enhancing the power of dealers. If tying impairs competition, it does so by limiting the access
of rival sellers to the downstream market or even by excluding them altogether. Unlike tie-ins,
moreover, intrabrand restraints are often self-limiting because they are more likely to injure the
manufacturer who employs them.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Notwithstanding Professor Areeda's articulation of distinctions between tie-ins and other vertical
restraints, it should be noted that unlike horizontal agreements (i.e., agreements among competitors),
tie-ins are restraints imposed by a seller on a buyer (which is typical of vertical restraints). Further,
even if Professor Areeda's assessment of the differences in effects is conceded, those differences
may still be taken into account in a rule of reason analysis balancing alleged anticompetitive effects
against asserted procompetitive virtues. Certainly the questions of market definition and market
power are common to all non-price vertical restraint cases, and the foreclosure issue emphasized by
Professor Areeda for tying analysis is also appropriate in other rule of reason cases.
278. For a discussion of Professor Areeda's advocacy of the foreclosure factor, see supra notes
251-52.
279. See supra notes 250-52.
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investigation and proof-a cost usually avoided pursuant to a classic per
se rule. Further, the fundamental rationale for per se illegality is absent
in tying cases. The major justification for per se principles is usually that
the restraint invalidated will almost always fall even after closer
examination pursuant to a rule of reason. This is simply not the case
with tying arrangements. In the absence of proof of market power,
courts uphold many tying arrangements and sustain others if defendants
can establish an affirmative defense. This clearly is not the stuff of per
se illegality.
Current reliance on a quasi-per se approach does indeed involve some
of the administrative and judicial costs of rule of reason analysis without
enjoyment of the benefits. Litigants must allege, discover, and analyze a
great deal of information to establish the elements of the so-called per se
tying violation. Yet, once plaintiffs prove these elements, courts ignore
procompetitive effects unless they fit within one of the narrow, judicially
created exceptions. There is little sense in requiring expenditure of
considerable time and resources but then stopping short of full analysis.
In a classic per se case, it is true that on occasion a restraint will be
condemned that might withstand more detailed scrutiny. At least in
those cases the benefit derived is that protracted discovery and trial are
avoided. In current tying doctrine, the resources are utilized anyway, and
an arguably wrong result may be reached.
To avoid confusion, achieve fairness, and further antitrust policy,
courts should abandon the per se and quasi-per se approaches completely
and replace them with a single rule of reason approach."5 0 The test would
then be the classic rule of reason-a balancing of any anticompetitive
effects against any procompetitive effects. This will place tying
arrangements in their proper place as non-price vertical restraints. In so
doing, courts may also confine alleged affirmative defenses to those
which benefit competition and weigh the alleged procompetitive effects
against any anticompetitive effects.
Although my call for a
straightforward adoption of rule of reason analysis :s not unprecedented,
perhaps it will contribute another voice to the chorus seeking the
attention of a majority of the Supreme Court. A clear and concise
repudiation of per se language could contribute much in the way of
280. In addition to Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Hyde, see supra notes 107-11 and
accompanying text, see Areeda, supranote 3, 1729, at 375-406, 1730d, at 413-14 (proposing a
rule of reason approach focusing on foreclosure of a substantial share of a tied market that is
concentrated or likely to become so). Cf Post-Chicago Analysis After Kodak: Interview with
ProfessorSteven C. Salop, supranote 274, at 22 (calling per selrule of reason debate "something of
a red herring" because of market power requirement).
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guidance for lower federal courts, business people, the practicing bar,
and the academic community.
B.

More CarefulAnalysis of Market Definition andMarket Power

One potentially positive aspect of the Kodak decision is its implicit
invitation for courts to deal more with economic reality than mere theory
in defining markets and assessing market power. In rule of reason
analysis, the presence or absence of market power will often be
determinative on the issue of unreasonableness. If consumers enjoy the
protection of interbrand competition and can avoid supercompetitive
prices by switching to a suitable substitute, a challenge to a restraint
allegedly based upon exploitation of market power makes little sense.
Rather, it would be more appropriate to conclude that a consumer is
making a choice in his or her best interests.
In the tying context, if a seller conditions the sale of product A upon
the buyer's agreement to also buy product B, and if product C is an
adequate substitute for A, it only makes sense to conclude that the buyer
preferred the package deal. If the buyer perceived the tying arrangement
as unfair or uneconomical, the buyer could simply purchase product C as
a substitute for A and either decline to buy B, buy B separately if
available, or buy an adequate substitute for B. No forcing would be
present in either case and any foreclosure of competition would flow not
from misuse of market power but from buyers' choosing a package
sale."'
The same may be said for other non-price vertical restraints where
market power is absent. For example, in a vertical territorial restraint
case, if consumers have suitable alternatives, a diminution of intrabrand
competition will not permit sellers to exploit the marketplace by raising
prices or restricting output. If a seller of X brand televisions were

281. However, if the foreclosure were significant enough to threaten competition in the market for
the tied product, the absence of market power in the tying product or true coercion should not
preclude a finding of liability. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text. This would be a
particularly appropriate situation for application of section 3 of the Clayton Act which addresses the
reasonable probability of a diminution of competition. Just recently, in Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993), a Robinson-Patman price discrimination case
dealing with predatory pricing and primary line injury, the Supreme Court recognized the different
thresholds for liability in the Sherman and Clayton Act statutory language. Both the majority, id. at
2587, and the dissent, id. at 2602 (Stevens, J., dissenting), acknowledged that the Clayton Act
language is broader and designed to reach trade restraints at a more preliminary stage. As Justice
Stevens noted in dissent, the Clayton Act is indeed an "incipiency" statute that can be applied to
restraints that "may" have the proscribed effect. Id. at 2603 (quoting Corn Prods. Refining Co. v.
FTC, 324 U.S. 726,738 (1945)).
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restricted to a particular geographic market by a :restraint (and even if
that seller faced no intrabrand competition in that market), the presence
of interchangeable Ybrand and Z brand sets would preclude any effort to
raise prices above a competitive level because that effort would be
unprofitable and cause severe loss of business. The restraint would
arguably present no anticompetitive threat." 2 On the other hand, if the
seller of X faced no interbrand competition in a well-defined geographic
market, the vertical restraint would be unreasonable because it fostered a

monopoly.
The critical issue in the foregoing examples is whether the seller
imposing the restraint of trade can use the restraint to an anticompetitive
end or whether the effect on competition will be either de minimis or
actually procompetitive. This may well depend on the presence or
absence of market power, which then will depend in part on market
definition. Even if market power will not be dispositive in every case, it
will be an important factor.
Kodak urged a pragmatic, economic approach to the market definition
question that requires close investigation of real world facts: Only
realistic alternatives for buyers should be included in the market
definition. To this practical approach courts should add other factors that
will provide a more accurate picture of a defendant's real power to
exploit a market. As a result, courts would not automatically presume
that low market share precludes a finding of unused residual power.
Alternatively, high market share may not reflect the degree of
282. An argument can, however, be made that a single seller without significant market power
itself could still negotiate a tie-in that would produce an anticompetitive effect. See supra notes
250-52 for authorities concluding that market power is not always necessary. It is possible that, in
an oligopolistic tying market where several sellers impose tie-ins, the cumulative effect in the tied
product market would be significant foreclosure. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949), an exclusive dealing case, the Supreme Court focused in part on the fact that the defendant's
competitors also utilized exclusive dealing arrangements, ther.by significantly increasing
foreclosure in the relevant market and threatening competition. Id. at 309. See also Areeda, supra
note 3, 1704c4, at 62, noting that:
Oligopolists in a tying market might transfer their concentrated market structure from the tying
to the tied market. To illustrate: suppose that all users of product B need product A, which is
supplied only by five sellers; each of them supplies A only to those who also take their B
requirements from him. So long as these tying arrangements continue, they create and maintain
an oligopoly in the tied market by denying all potential customer3 to any new supplier of B.
This total denial of potential patronage to others is well captured by the 100-percent foreclosure
that results from adding together the separate foreclosures of each tying seller.
Professor Areeda also states that a proper inquiry into the effects of a tie-in should focus on the
"cumulative impact," even where the individual tie "forecloses only a modest portion of the tied
market." Id. 1709d2, at 103. Areeda fturther suggests that this cumulation should be calculated by
including "all practices that bring about foreclosure," including requirements contracts. Id. at 104.
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substitutability available to consumers from actual or potential
competition. Courts should consider other measures of market power if
these measures do reveal an ability to raise price over competitive levels.
Kodak opened a window of opportunity for courts to assess market
definition and power questions in a pragmatic, fact-intensive, case-bycase manner. Courts should welcome the invitation and once again
consider uniqueness claims and other arguments suggesting that
consumers really do not perceive alleged substitutes as reasonably
interchangeable. In addition, where market definitions fail to include
competitors who do check the ability to exploit alleged power, a more
extensive and practical approach to the problem can produce a more fully
accurate assessment of market power. This change in analytical method
would be useful not only in tying cases, but would also benefit courts in
any section 1 or section 2 case where market power plays a critical role.
By eschewing reliance on any oxymoronic, archaic, quasi-per se rule
in section 1 tying cases, the Supreme Court could clarify and simplify
this mystifying area of antitrust jurisprudence. A straightforward
rejection of per se language in this context and the clear adoption of the
rule of reason approach as the exclusive method of analysis would yield
better and more consistent results. It would bring tying analysis into the
mainstream and allow sellers to plan their marketing strategies better. In
doing so, however, courts must get a handle on the market definition and
power issues in order to protect buyers and sellers alike from
economically foolish judicial decisions that either fail to protect
adequately or overprotect where the market could instead provide the
needed discipline. All alleged defenses for tie-ins should be subsumed in
the rule of reason analysis and explained in terms of benefits to
competition. Asserted defenses that are premised on other values should
be rejected; only procompetitive effects warrant consideration pursuant
to the rule of reason.283
283. This suggestion leaves unresolved questions regarding the continued role of section 3 of the
Clayton Act in tying cases where the jurisdictional requirements of that statute are satisfied by the
presence of commodities in both the tying and tied markets. If the cases and scholars concluding
that section I and section 3 have coalesced are correct, see supra note 255, the section 3 analysis
may proceed along the same lines as the proposed section 1 approach.
If, however, the plain language of section 3, together with the legislative history and contrary
precedent, do dictate a lower threshold of liability, my proposed rule of reason approach only covers
section 1 cases. In that event, perhaps section 3 analysis could proceed by utilizing the "dangerous
probability of success" element of the section 2 approach to attempts to monopolize. More
specifically, tying arrangements which threaten to ripen into clearly anticompetitive restraints satisfy
the "reasonable probability" standard articulated in earlier section 3 cases. Even if the tie-in cannot
be shown under section 1 to actually create a significant anticompetitive impact at present, the
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VI. CONCLUSION
Kodak's implications for tying doctrine and the future of American
antitrust jurisprudence generally are far from certain. There is enough in
the decision to lend some credence to a variety of different antitrust
philosophies. Some will view it as a unique, narrow case with little
general significance. Others will perceive it as the beginning of a new
era of antitrust that abandons the highly theoretical Chicago School
approach and replaces it with a new pragmatism.
My own view is that only time will tell what Kodak's impact will be.
There is not yet enough evidence in the lower court decisions to
determine whether Kodak will alter dramatically the course of antitrust
decision making. It will also be important to note how the Supreme
Court itself chooses to treat Kodak in its future antitrust deliberations.
Perhaps in a another year or two it will be easier to ascertain whether
Kodak will take its place alongside other landmark antitrust decisions as
a ground-breaking precedent or whether it will be distinguished into
obsolescence. One thing, however, is certain-Kodak will undoubtedly
provide academicians and practitioners with much to think about and
discuss in their attempts to make sense of our increasingly confused
antitrust doctrine.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court and Congress will need to reassess
United States antitrust policy and determine whether to provide more
direct and unambiguous guidance. At present, th.e debate continues
regarding even the most fundamental goals of antitrust, and the Court in
Kodak provides an unclear and mixed message that makes prediction
rather difficult even for the most diligent observers and analysts.8

"dangerous probability" that the tie could do so in the future would suffice to satisfy section 3. This
would be consistent with an "incipiency" approach to Clayton Act liability. See supranote 281, for
a discussion of the Supreme Court's recent recognition of the Clayton Act as an "incipiency" statute.
For recent discussion of the attempt to monopolize offense, see Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,
113 S. Ct. 884 (1993).
Further, courts could deem section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988),
which proscribes "unfair methods of competition," as violated by any practice which violates either
section 1 or section 3. See Areeda, supranote 3, 1702, at 32, 1719c, at 257 (noting that FTC Act
covers at least as much as the Sherman or Clayton Acts).
284. Compare Jacobs, supra note 240, at 356 (viewing Kodak as a "dramatic break from the
past') with Festa, supra note 240, at 671 (concluding that "reports of the Chicago School's demise
are greatly exaggerated").

